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Abstract
This dissertation is comprised of two essays, both of which study how particular
market environments affect firms’ abilities to price discriminate.
In the first chapter, I analyze the pricing decisions of airlines in monopoly
markets. Airline markets are noted for having several key features: (1) airlines
have limited capacity and limited time to sell, (2) airlines face uncertainty in the
popularity of any given flight, and (3) consumers who purchase tickets close to
the departure date are less price sensitive than those who buy well in advance.
These forces influence the pricing decision – what I call dynamic adjustment to
stochastic demand (1 and 2) and intertemporal price discrimination (3). While
the previous literature has emphasized each force in isolation, in this chapter, I
estimate a model of dynamic airline pricing taking both into account. I use an
original data set of daily fares and seat availabilities at the flight level. With
model estimates, I disentangle key interactions between the arrival pattern of
consumer types and remaining capacity under stochastic demand. I find dynamic
adjustment to stochastic demand is particularly important as a means to secure
seats for high-valuing consumers who arrive close to the departure date. It leads
to substantial revenue gains compared to pricing policies which depend on date
of purchase but not remaining capacity. In aggregate consumers benefit, despite
facing higher fares on average, as a result of more efficient capacity allocation.
Finally, I show an empirical procedure abstracting from stochastic demand will
systematically understate the price insensitivity of consumers who search for tick-
ets close to the date of travel.
iii
In the second chapter, Brian Adams and I develop an empirical analysis of
zone pricing under competition. While monopolists can only increase profits by
adopting more granular pricing policies, this is not necessarily the case in markets
with competition. Using an original data set for the retail drywall industry, we
estimate a structural model of supply and demand. We use the model estimates
to calculate equilibrium under alternative pricing policies to quantify the welfare
implications of zone pricing. We find consumer surplus decreases substantially but
firm profits appear to increase with finer pricing. As firms have not adopted these
policies, they must face some additional costs. We call these costs “spatial menu
costs,” and our analysis finds them to be substantial: at least 22.1% of estimated
profits, or 2.2% of revenues. Finally, we show that competitive interaction plays
an important role in recovering menu costs – failing to account for competitive
effects leads to an overestimate of profit gains and implied menu costs by 32.9%.
iv
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Chapter 1
Dynamic Airline Pricing and Seat
Availability
1.1 Introduction
Airlines tend to charge high prices to passengers who search for tickets close to
the date of travel. The conventional view is that these are business travelers,
and airlines capture their high willingness to pay through intertemporal price
discrimination. Airlines also adjust prices on a day-to-day basis as capacity is
limited and the future demand for any given flight is uncertain. While fares
generally increase as the departure date approaches, prices can actually fall from
one day to the next, after a sequence of low demand realizations.
This paper examines pricing in the airline industry taking into account both
forces – intertemporal price discrimination and dynamic adjustment to stochas-
tic demand. I use a new flight-level data set to estimate a structural model of
dynamic airline pricing where firms face a stochastic arrival of consumers. The
mix of consumer types – business and leisure travelers – changes over time, and in
1
2the estimated model, late-arriving consumers are significantly more price inelastic
than consumers who arrive early on. With model estimates, I simulate the rev-
enue losses associated with a pricing system which allows for intertemporal price
discrimination, but not dynamic adjustment. I find these losses to be substan-
tial, suggesting that the addition of dynamic adjustment creates an important
complementarity in the pricing channels. My results provide credence as to why
airlines have pioneered such complex pricing systems: having prices respond to
stochastic demand allows firms to first secure seats for the high-valuing consumers
who arrive close to the departure date, and then charge these consumers very high
prices.
Existing research demonstrates the importance of intertemporal price discrim-
ination in the airline industry. The view is that business consumers learn of
last-minute meetings and are willing to pay a premium in order to reserve a seat,
while leisure consumers are more price sensitive and book tickets well in advance.
Consistent with the idea of market segmentation, Puller, Sengupta, and Wiggins
(2012) find that ticket characteristics, such as advance purchase discount (APD)
requirements, explain much of the variation in fares over time. Recently, Lazarev
(2013) estimated a model of intertemporal price discrimination and he found a
substantial role for this force.
The literature also shows that dynamic adjustment plays an important role
in airline pricing. Escobari (2012) and Alderighi, Nicolini, and Piga (2012) find
evidence that airlines face stochastic demand and prices respond to remaining
capacity. In particular, Escobari (2012) estimates the pricing functions of airlines.
He notes that fares decline in the absence of sales while having reduced capacity in
any given period results in increased fares.1 These results support the theoretical
1Puller, Sengupta, and Wiggins (2012) find limited support that seat scarcity explains the
3predictions of Gallego and Van Ryzin (1994) and a large branch of research in op-
erations management that have studied optimal pricing under uncertain demand,
limited capacity, and limited time to sell. This work has been used to inform
airline revenue management systems.2 Such systems allow airlines to respond to
stochastic demand by increasing fares when a sellout is likely and fall otherwise,
as to not leave as many seats unfilled.
While previous work emphasizes the importance of intertemporal price dis-
crimination and stochastic demand pricing separately, this paper examines both
forces together and highlights how they interact. I establish two key points about
the interaction. First, intertemporal price discrimination and dynamic adjust-
ment to stochastic demand are complements in the airline industry. This follows
because inelastic consumers tend to arrive last. In order to be in a position to
price discriminate and set high prices to these late-arriving consumers, the firm
will want to allow fares to adjust to realizations in demand. Second, in order to
estimate how demand elasticity changes over time, which is needed to calculate
the welfare effects of intertemporal price discrimination, it is necessary to take
stochastic demand into account. The reason is that by ignoring stochastic de-
mand, the opportunity cost of selling a seat is the same regardless of the date of
purchase. But with stochastic demand, the opportunity cost changes over time.
This matters because inferences regarding demand elasticity come from the firm’s
first-order condition in choice of price, which relates prices and marginal costs to
demand elasticities. If marginal costs are incorrect, then the estimated change in
variation of fares for major US routes. However, Alderighi, Nicolini, and Piga (2012) find evi-
dence that both characteristics and capacity matter. They find the role of capacity is pronounced
in less competitive markets.
2There is a large literature on stochastic demand pricing (revenue management, yield man-
agement, or dynamic pricing). An overview of the dynamic pricing literature can be found in
Elmaghraby and Keskinocak (2003) and Talluri and Van Ryzin (2005). Seat inventory control
has also been studied; see Dana (1999).
4demand elasticity is also incorrect.
In order to investigate dynamic airline pricing, a detailed data set of ticket
purchases is required. However, the standard airline data sets used in economic
studies (Goolsbee and Syverson (2008); Gerardi and Shapiro (2009); Berry and
Jia (2010) for example) are either at the monthly or quarterly level. Recently,
papers have been using new data to get to the flight level. McAfee and Te Velde
(2006) and Lazarev (2013) create data sets containing high frequency fares. Other
papers have obtained high frequency data on prices and a measure of quantities.
Puller, Sengupta, and Wiggins (2012) use a unique transaction data set from
a single computer reservation system. Escobari (2012) and Clark and Vincent
(2012) collect fare and flight availability data, where the available number of seats
is derived from publicly available seat maps. I create a similar data set with a
key improvement. I use a new data source that allows me to see the same flight
availability data that travel agents see. Specifically, the seat maps I collect allow
me to distinguish between blocked and occupied seats. Without accounting for
blocked seats, I find seat maps overstate load factors (seats occupied / capacity)
by 10%. In addition, I provide evidence that seat maps are a useful proxy of
bookings.
The sample contains the time path of fares and seat availabilities for over 1,300
flights in US monopoly markets. The structure of the data allows me to capture
over one hundred departures of a single flight number, where each flight is tracked
for sixty days. Descriptive analysis of the data reveals a strong role of remaining
capacity in explaining the variation of daily fares. By investigating the pricing
decisions of routes with two flights a day, I find that if one flight option is 30%
more full, the flight is roughly 35% more expensive compared to the other option.
Also, consistent with the ideas of stochastic demand pricing, 35% of fares change
5daily and 10% of the itineraries in the sample result in a fire-sale.
While the empirical evidence above is informative, it cannot be used to disen-
tangle the interactions between intertemporal price discrimination and stochastic
demand pricing. I proceed by estimating a structural model. The model includes
three key ingredients: (i) firms have finite capacity and finite time to sell, (ii)
firms face a stochastic arrival of consumers, and (iii) the mix of consumers, cor-
responding to business and leisure travelers, is allowed to change over time. The
firm solves a stochastic dynamic programming problem. For the demand system, I
assume a stochastic process brings new consumers to the market. The consumers
that arrive know when they want to travel and solve a static problem, choosing
to either buy a ticket on an available flight or exit the market permanently. The
demand model differs from earlier theoretical work, including Gale and Holmes
(1993), where consumers do not know if they wish to fly and waiting provides
more information. In my model the only reason to wait is to bet on price, and
since prices tend to increase, I show only a small transaction cost is needed to
persuade consumers to decide whether to travel in the current period. In addition,
I provide empirical evidence that suggests this is a reasonable assumption.3
The key identification challenge of the model is to separately identify the
parameters associated with the arrival process from the parameters governing the
change in elasticity over time. My identification strategy relies on accounting for
the firm’s pricing choice. By solving the firm’s dynamic problem, I back out the
firm’s beliefs on current and future demand. Variation in sales conditional on seats
and time relating inform the arrival process, and the firm’s optimality conditions
relate the pricing decision to the demand elasticity each period.
Using the model estimates, I compare the allocation of scarce capacity across
3Li, Granados, and Netessine (2013) studies dynamic consumer behavior in airline markets.
Depending on the specification, they find between 5% and 20% of consumers are dynamic.
6time under dynamic pricing with several counterfactual pricing systems. I first
shut down the use of dynamic pricing so that the monopolist can only charge a
uniform price. I find that uniform pricing results in a significant reallocation of
capacity across consumers and time, but the gains in consumer surplus are miti-
gated as a result of inefficient capacity allocation. Further, uniform pricing results
is a significant decline (6.6%) in revenues, more than offsetting the increase in con-
sumer welfare (1.4%). As airlines operate under razor thin margins, the decrease
in revenues would likely result in market exit in the long run.4 Using dynamic
and uniform pricing as benchmarks I then allow the firm to use dynamic pricing,
but restrict the frequency of price updates. I find that even minor restrictions on
the frequency of price adjustments results in significant revenue reductions.
I then single out the use of intertemporal price discrimination alone by con-
sidering a pricing system which depends on date of purchase, but not remaining
capacity. By comparing uniform pricing to this intermediate case, and this in-
termediate case with dynamic pricing, I quantify the relative importance of in-
tertemporal price discrimination and adjusting to stochastic demand. I find that
roughly half the revenue gains of using dynamic pricing over uniform pricing comes
from the intertemporal price discrimination channel, with the remaining half com-
ing from dynamic adjustment. Dynamic pricing substantially increases revenues
(3.5%) over the use of intertemporal price discrimination alone as firms are able
to allocate more seats to late-arriving business consumers, who are then charged
high prices. Additionally, I find that overall, both business and leisure welfare
is higher under dynamic pricing compared to intertemporal price discrimination
4According to an IATA industry report (Profitability and the Air Transport Profitability and
the Air Transport Value Chain), the average fare paid per passenger in 2012 was $181.91, with
an average cost per passenger of $225.70. After accounting for auxiliary and cargo revenue, they
estimate the net profit per passenger to be $2.56.
7alone. Although business consumers are charged higher fares under dynamic pric-
ing, they also benefit from having more seats available. Leisure consumers benefit
from lower fares as dynamic adjustment reduces the firm’s incentive of holding
back capacity in early periods.
Intertemporal price discrimination and dynamic adjustment to stochastic de-
mand are complements in the airline industry because high-valuing consumers
arrive late. To highlight this complementarity, I perform two analyses. First, I
reverse the arrival process of consumers so that the high-valuing consumers arrive
first. In this environment, I find that intertemporal price discrimination accounts
for a much larger percentage (25% more) of the value of dynamic pricing. This
follows because there is no need for the firm to save seats until close to the de-
parture date.5 Second, I hold the mix of business and leisure consumers constant
over time. This analysis reveals the revenue gains associated with dynamic ad-
justment are half the gains attained under the estimated arrival process where
high-valuing consumers show up late. This result is consistent with the theory of
Gallego and Van Ryzin (1994), and emphasizes that stochastic demand pricing
is especially valuable in the airline industry because of the particular pattern of
consumer arrival.
Finally, I show how estimation approaches that do not take into account
stochastic demand will systematically understate the degree to which demand
becomes more inelastic as the departure date approaches.
5This analysis assumes consumers do not wait to purchase. Stokey (1979) shows an environ-
ment in which a monopolist of durable goods that commits to pricing would not use intertempo-
ral price discrimination as consumers with high valuations would strategically wait to purchase.
Conlisk, Gerstner, and Sobel (1984) and Board (2008) consider durable goods models with time
dependent demand.
8Related Literature
This paper adds to the growing empirical work on intertemporal price discrimina-
tion and dynamic adjustment to stochastic demand. Intertemporal price discrim-
ination can be found in many markets, including video games, Broadway theater,
and concerts (Nair (2007), Leslie (2004), and Courty and Pagliero (2012), respec-
tively).6 A closely related paper to mine is Lazarev (2013), who estimates the
welfare effects of intertemporal price discrimination in US monopoly airline mar-
kets. His model includes dynamic consumers, but abstracts away from aggregate
demand uncertainty. There is a large literature in economics and operations re-
search on stochastic demand pricing.7 Talluri and Van Ryzin (2004) and Vulcano,
van Ryzin, and Chaar (2010) provide insights into the estimation of (discretized)
continuous time demand models with myopic consumers. Like Vulcano, van Ryzin,
and Chaar (2010), I estimate a discrete choice model with Poisson arrival; how-
ever, I also allow for two consumer types. I use information on the pricing decision
of the firm to aid in the identification of the parameters. Importantly, McAfee
and Te Velde (2006) note that stochastic demand models – models which do not
incorporate changes in willingness to pay over time – do not match the positive
trend in airfares as the departure date approaches. By investigating both forces
simultaneously, my model is able to capture both the positive trend in fares as
well as the day-to-day variation in fares, including price declines. To the best of
6Lambrecht, Seim, Vilcassim, Cheema, Chen, Crawford, Hosanagar, Iyengar, Koenigsberg,
Lee, et al. (2012) provide an overview of empirical work on price discrimination. Interestingly,
Jones (2012) notes that some theaters are now using the same pricing techniques of airlines.
7An overview of the stochastic demand pricing (or also called: dynamic pricing or revenue
management depending on the context) literature can be found in Elmaghraby and Keskinocak
(2003) and Talluri and Van Ryzin (2005). Sweeting (2012) analyzes ticket resale markets.
Pashigian and Bowen (1991) and Soysal and Krishnamurthi (2012) study clearance sales and
seasonal goods, respectively. Zhao and Zheng (2000) and Su (2007) discuss extensions to dy-
namic pricing models, including consumer dynamics.
9my knowledge, this is the first paper to quantify the complementarities between
intertemporal price discrimination and dynamic adjustment to stochastic demand
through a structural model.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 describes the data
collected for this study. Section 1.3 presents the model. Section 1.4 discusses the
econometric specification and identification of the model parameters. Section 1.5
presents the results of estimation. Section 1.6 presents the counterfactuals. The
conclusion follows.
1.2 Data
I create an original data set of high frequency airfares and seat availabilities with
data collected from two popular online travel services. The first web service used
is a travel metasearch engine. I use the web service to obtain daily fares at the
itinerary level.8 I obtain all one way and round trip itinerary fares where the length
of stay is less than eight days. The fares recorded correspond to the cheapest
ticket available for purchase. The second web service returns flight availabilities
by allowing users to query real-time seat maps as well as look up detailed fare
information. I compare the time series of seat maps to derive seat availabilities
and thus, recover bookings across time. The data set contains fare and flight
availability data for ten markets collected over a six month period in 2012. In
total, the sample contains 1,328 flight departures and more than 80,000 one-way
fare/seat map observations.
In the following subsections, I highlight features of the data. I first discuss
route selection. I then confront the issue that seat maps may not accurately
8I define an itinerary to be a routing, airline, flight number(s), and departure date(s) combi-
nation.
10
reflect true flight loads. I perform two analyses that suggest the measurement
error in seat maps is likely to be small. I then provide summary statistics for
the sample. The last subsection documents preliminary evidence in the data. I
document that: (i) prices fluctuate across time, but systematic fare increases are
common, (ii) remaining capacity is important in explaining the variation in fares,
(iii) there is no evidence that consumers anticipate systematic fare hikes.
1.2.1 Route Selection
I select markets to study using historical DB1B tables. These publicly available
tables contain a 10% of domestic ticket purchases and are at the quarterly level.
I define a market in the DB1B as an origin, destination, quarter. I single out
markets where:
(i) there is only one carrier operating;9
(ii) there is no nearby alternative airport;
(iii) at least 95% of flight traffic is not connecting to other cities;
(iv) total quarterly traffic is greater than 3,000 passengers;
(v) total quarterly traffic is less than 30,000 passengers;
(vi) there is high nonstop traffic.
One important issue with using seat maps is figuring out which itinerary and
hence which fare, to attribute to each seat map change. Since airlines offer ex-
tensive networks, the disappearance of a single seat could be associated with one
of several thousand possible itineraries. This is an important consideration since
970.12% of routes in the US are monopoly.
11
the pricing of feeder routes tends to be different than main routes. Criteria (iii)
addresses this by selecting routes where most traffic is not connecting to other
cities. Criteria (iv) corresponds to routes with less than 75% load factor (seats
occupied / capacity) of a daily 50-seat aircraft. This criteria removes routes with
irregular service. Criteria (v) removes most routes with greater than three flights
a day. I implement this criteria to keep the data collection process manageable. I
then look for routes with (vi) high nonstop traffic. This criteria is important for
establishing the relevant outside option in the demand model. In the data, (vi)
is negatively correlated with distance (ρ = −.5). Cities with very high nonstop
traffic percentages tend to be short flights. Given such short distances, many
consumers may choose to instead drive. At the same time, markets with large dis-
tances typically have lower nonstop traffic percentages, meaning more consumers
purchase tickets such as one stop.
I select five city pairs, or ten directional routings (markets), given the selection
criteria above. All directional routings either originate or end in Boston, MA. The
other cities are: Portland, OR, San Diego, CA, Austin, TX, Kansas City, MO, and
Jacksonville, FL. The selected markets have close to 100% direct traffic, meaning
very few passengers connect to other cities. The percent is nonstop traffic ranges
between 40% and 60%. Three of the five city pairs are operated by JetBlue.
The other airlines in the sample are Delta Air Lines and Alaska Airlines.10 The
selected markets are all low frequency as at most two flights are operated in either
direction daily. Most days see a single flight frequency with double daily service
on select routes during peak weeks of the summer or on weekends.11
10At the time of data collection, flights between Kansas City and Boston were operated by
regional carriers on behalf of Delta Air Lines. Since Delta Air Lines determines the fares for
this market, I collectively call these regional carriers Delta.
11This is not exceptional. The average number of frequencies across routes in the US is 1.95
flights per day. Over 60% of US routes see a single fight a day.
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Two other features of the data are worth being noted. First, both JetBlue
and Alaska price itineraries at the segment level. Consumers wishing to purchase
round-trip tickets on these carriers in fact purchase two one-way tickets. As a
consequence, round-trip fares in these markets are exactly equal to the sum of
the corresponding one-way fares. Since fares must be attributed to each seat map
change, this feature of the data makes it easier to justify the fare involved. Second,
JetBlue does not oversell flights, while most other air carriers do.12 Since most of
the markets I study are operated by JetBlue, in the model, I assume firms do not
oversell.
1.2.2 Inference and Accuracy of Seat Maps
A seat map is a graphical representation of occupied and unoccupied seats for a
given flight at a select point in time before the departure date. Many airlines that
have assigned seating present seat maps to consumers during the booking process.
When a consumer books a ticket and selects a seat, the seat map changes – an
unoccupied seat becomes occupied. The next consumer wishing to purchase a
ticket on the flight is offered an updated seat map and has a choice amongst the
remaining unoccupied seats. By differencing seat maps across time – in this case
daily – inferences can be made about bookings.
Figure 1.1 presents a sample seat map. The seat map indicates occupied seats
in solid blue. The unshaded blocks correspond to unoccupied seats. Seats with
a “P” are available seats, but classified as premium. These seats are toward the
front of the aircraft or seats located in exit rows. Finally, the seat map indicates
seats currently blocked by the airline with “X”s. Seats that are blocked are usually
12On the legal section of the JetBlue website, under Passenger Service Plan: “JetBlue does not
overbook flights. However some situations, such as flight cancellations and reaccommodation,
might create a similar situation.”
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Figure 1.1: An example seat map. The white blocks are unoccupied seats, the
blue blocks are occupied, the blocks with the X’s are blocked seats, and the blocks
with a ”P” are premium, unoccupied seats.
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not disclosed on airline websites; however, I am able to capture this data through
the web service used. Seats may be blocked due to crew rest, weight and balance,
because a seat is broken, or because the airline reserves handicap accessible seats
until the day of departure. In addition, seat blocking may be used to encourage
consumers to purchase tickets or upgrade as they give the impression the cabin
is closer to capacity. However, the data suggests that airlines predominantly
block seats in exit rows and at the front and/or back of the cabin until closer
to the departure date or when bookings demand additional seats. The decision
is dynamic as over 70% of the flights in the sample experience changes in the
number of blocked seats.13 For every seat map collected, I aggregate the number
of occupied, unoccupied, and blocked seats. I compare the aggregate counts across
days to determine net bookings by day before departure.
Unfortunately, seat maps may not be accurate representations of true flight
loads. This is especially problematic if consumers do not select seats at the time
of booking. This measurement error would systematically understate sales early
on, but then overstate last minute sales when consumers without existing seat
assignments are assigned seats. From a modeling perspective, this measurement
error would lead to an overstatement of the arrival of business consumers. Ideally,
the severity of measurement error of my data can be assessed by matching changes
in seat maps with bookings, however this is impossible with the publicly available
data. In order to gauge the magnitude of the measurement error in using seat
maps, I perform two different data analyses, which are only briefly discussed here,
13I do not model the decision to block/unblock seats; however, I do take this information into
account when determining bookings. Knowing which seats are blocked is important because it
allows me to distinguish between consumers canceling or purchasing tickets and airlines adjusting
the supply of seats. For example, if it were not possible to distinguish between blocked and
occupied seats, if an airline unblocks six seats, I would erroneously conclude six passengers
canceled tickets.
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but are detailed in the Appendix.
First, I match monthly enplanements using my seat maps with actual monthly
enplanements reported in the T100 Segment tables. By comparing these aggre-
gate measures, I find my seat maps understate true enplanements by 0.81% of
load factor at the monthly level. To investigate the measurement error at the ob-
servation, or flight-day level, I create a separate data set by collecting information
from an airline that provides seat maps as well as reported flight loads. With this
data, I find seat maps understate reported load factor by 2.3%, with a range of
0% to 4% by day before departure. These two analyses suggest the measurement
error associated with the seat maps in the sample is likely to be small. I proceed
by using the capacity of the plane minus the number of occupied and blocked
seats as the number of seats available in the proceeding analysis.14
1.2.3 Summary Statistics
Summary statistics for the data sample appear in Table 1.1. The average oneway
ticket in my sample is $282 whereas the average roundtrip fare is $528. The
discrepancy in one-way and round-trip fares can be attributed to the flights op-
erated by Delta, since Delta does not price at the segment level but both Alaska
and JetBlue do.
Reported load factor is the number of occupied seats divided by capacity the
day flights leave, and is reported between 0 and 1. In my sample, the average load
factor is 85%, ranging from 77% to 89% by market. The booking rate corresponds
to the mean difference in occupied seats across consecutive days. I find the average
14By treating blocked seats as occupied, I find the monthly load factors for my routes exceed
95%, which is inconsistent with the reported carrier statistics found in the T100. Treating
blocked seats as unoccupied results in a 0.81% difference in load factor with reported carrier
data.
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Table 1.1: Summary statistics for the sample.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 5th pctile 95th pctile
Oneway fare ($) 282.23 118.03 129.80 498.80
Roundtrip fare ($) 528.09 202.30 279.60 917.60
Load factor 0.85 0.08 0.69 0.98
Daily booking rate 0.78 1.61 0 4
Daily fare change ($) 5.77 52.79 -60.00 87.00
Daily fare change rate 0.35 0.10 0.17 0.52
Unique fares (per itin.) 12.76 3.50 7 19
Noneway = 80, 550
booking rate to be 0.78 seats per day, per flight. At the 5th percentile, zero seats
per flight are booked a day, and at the 95th percentile, four seats per flight are
booked a day. Airline markets are associated with low daily demand as 56.8%
of the seat maps in the sample do not change across consecutive days. The fare
change rate is an indicator variable equal to one if the itinerary fare changes
across consecutive days. I find the daily rate of fare changes to be 35%, so that
the itineraries in my sample typically change price 21 times in 60 days.
Due to institutional details concerning airline pricing practices, only a discrete
number of fares are seen in the data. The last row indicates the number of unique
fares per itinerary. On average, each itinerary reaches 12.7 unique fares, and
given that the average itinerary sees 21 fare changes on average, this implies fares
fluctuate up and down usually several times within 60 days.
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1.3 Preliminary Evidence from the Data
With a description of the main features of the data complete, I now move into
documenting preliminary evidence from the data. This analysis provides addi-
tional details concerning the data, but it is also meant to motivate features of the
model. First, I document the pricing patterns in the data. This descriptive analy-
sis shows airlines commonly implement systematic fare hikes, but fares frequently
change daily. Second, I show that remaining capacity is important in explaining
the variation in observed fares. Finally, I investigate if there is evidence that
consumers anticipate systematic fare hikes.
Pricing Patterns
Figure 1.2 shows the frequency and magnitude of fare changes across time. The
left panel indicates the fraction of itineraries that experience fare hikes versus fare
discounts by day before departure, and the right panel indicates the magnitude
of these fare changes (i.e. a plot of first differences, conditional on the direction
of the fare change). For example, in the left plot, 40 days prior to departure,
roughly 20% of fares increase and 20% of fares decrease. The remaining 60% of
fares are held constant. Moving to the right panel, the magnitude of fare hikes
and declines 40 days out is roughly $50.
The left panel confirms fares change throughout time, including fare declines.
The fraction of fares that decline over time is roughly U-shaped, increasing through
roughly three weeks prior to departure, peaking at 20%, and then declining to
roughly 10% the day before departure. Note that well before the departure
date, the number of fare hikes and declines is roughly split even. The fraction of
itineraries that experience fare hikes increases over time. There are four noticeable
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Figure 1.2: Fraction and magnitude of fare changes by day before departure
Notes: (left) Fraction of fares that increase/decrease across consecutive days. (right) Mag-
nitude of fare changes across time.
jumps in the line indicating fare hikes. These jumps correspond to crossing 3, 7,
14 and 21 days prior to departure, or when advance purchase discounts placed
on many tickets expire.15 The use of advance purchase discounts (APDs) is con-
sistent with the story of intertemporal price discrimination, since fares increase
unconditional on remaining capacity. Surprisingly though, the use of advance
purchase discounts is not universal. Only 35% of itineraries experience fare hikes
at 21 days and less than 60% increase at 14 days. Just under 70% of itineraries
see an increase in fare when crossing the 7-day APD requirement.
15Advance purchase discounts are sometimes placed at 4, 10, and 30 days prior to departure,
but this is not the case for the data I collect.
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The right panel shows the magnitude of fare changes towards the departure
date, conditional on the direction of the change (increase/decrease). There are two
findings worth mentioning. First is that the magnitude of fare hikes and declines
are similar – at around $50 but increasing in time. Second, the magnitude of fare
increases when crossing APD days is similar to the magnitude of fare increases on
other days.
Figure 1.2 shows just how dynamic airline pricing is. Fares are constantly in-
creasing and decreasing. Consistent with the theory of stochastic demand pricing,
fire-sales do occur – roughly 10% of the itineraries in these sample decrease over
$175 within 24 hours of the departure date. On the other hand, fares systemati-
cally increase at routine intervals, which is consistent with airlines segmenting the
market between business and leisure customers.
Moving to statistics in levels, Figure 1.5 plots the mean fare and mean load
factor (seats occupied/capacity) by day before departure. The plot confirms the
overall trend in prices is positive, with fares increasing from roughly $225 to over
$375 in sixty days. The noticeable jumps in the fare time series occur when
crossing the APD fences noted in Figure 1.2. At sixty days prior to departure,
roughly 45% of seats are already occupied; consequently, I observe about half the
bookings on any given flight. The booking curve for flights in the sample is smooth
across time, leveling off roughly three days prior to departure at 85%, which closely
matches monthly enplanement totals found in the publicly available T100 Segment
data. The fact that fares tend to double but consumers still purchase tickets is
suggestive evidence that consumers of different types purchase tickets towards the
date of travel.
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The Role of Remaining Capacity
A key source of the variation in fares can be attributed to the scarcity of seats.
I provide descriptive evidence of this two ways. First, I compare fares and load
factor when two flights are offered a day. I calculate the difference in fare (∆fare)
and difference in load factor (∆LF) across the two flight options by day before
departure. When calculating the difference, I assign the first flight of the pair to
be the flight with the greater number of seats occupied. This implies ∆LF > 0. By
comparing fares for the two flights by day before departure, I control for systematic
fare changes associated with intertemporal price discrimination.
Figure 1.3: The role of capacity in explaining fare variation
Nonparametric regression of difference in fare by difference in load factor from
comparing fares and load factors for one-way itineraries where two flights are
available. n = 20, 062.
Figure 1.3 shows nonparametric fitted values as well as the 95% confidence
interval of these calculations in percentage terms. The plot suggests that when
the two options have the same number of seats occupied, the average difference
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in fare is close to zero. If one option is 20% more full, the flight which is more
full is also 25%, or roughly $60, more expensive. The line remains upward sloping
throughout observed differences in load factor, where at the extreme, a flight that
is 30% more full is also 35% more expensive.16
I perform a similar analysis using the entire sample by calculating the mean
difference in fare and load factor at the flight number, day before departure level.
Figure 1.4 shows nonparametric fitted values of this procedure. The line is again
upward sloping across differences in load factor, where flights with lower load
factor compared to the average are also less expensive. Likewise, flights that that
have a higher occupancy compared to the average are also more expensive.
Figure 1.4: Lowess of mean differences in fare and load factor.
16Applying similar methodology to round trip itineraries with two options – a single outbound
flight and the choice of two return flights, or two outbound flights and a single return flight –
yields similar results.
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Figure 1.5: Mean fare and load factor by day before departure.
Do consumers dynamically substitute across booking days?
The booking curve of flights plotted in Figure 1.5 is smooth, even though fares tend
to increase by nearly $50 when crossing the advance purchase discount thresholds.
This result is surprising since bunching in sales should be seen before the discounts
expire if consumers anticipate systematic fare hikes. This is not the case as the
only noticeable jump in load factor appears right before flights leave. I test for
discontinuities in the booking curve using regressions of the following form:
LF =
−−−→
APD +m(t) + u+ ε,
where
−−−→
APD are dummy variables corresponding to the day before advance pur-
chase discounts expire, m(t) is a flexible function in time, and u are other fixed
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effects. Regression results appear in Table 1.2. Across all specifications, I find that
none of the advance purchase discount dummies are significant; moreover, the 21
and 3 day advance purchase discount dummies are negative, which is inconsistent
with bunching.
The fact that the there is no evidence of bunching suggests that consumers
either do not anticipate the fences or are possibly restricted in some other way
from being able to purchase before the advance purchase discounts expire. Alter-
natively, it could be the case that consumers substitute to a different departure
date, however this does not explain why the booking rate is similar after the dis-
counts expire. I use this feature of the data to motivate a demand system where
consumers do not dynamically substitute across booking days. Further, I show
after estimating the model that since prices tend to increase across time, this
provides little incentive for consumers to wait to purchase tickets.
1.4 A Model of Dynamic Airline Pricing
In this section, I write down a structural model of dynamic airline pricing where
firms face a stochastic arrival of consumers, and the mix of consumer types –
corresponding to leisure and business consumers – is allowed to change over time.
To make the analysis tractable, I incorporate the following simplifications in the
model. First, the model studies the pricing decisions of airlines operating in
monopoly markets. In this way, the paper can focus on intertemporal price
discrimination and stochastic demand, and avoid the complexities of modeling
oligopolistic competition. As noted earlier, a large fraction of airline routes are
monopoly. Second, I assume that when consumers first learn about their interest
in travel, all travel plan uncertainty is immediately resolved. Consumers pay a
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Table 1.2: Dynamic Substitution Regressions
Model Specification
(1) (2) (3)
APD3
−0.170 −0.171 −0.163
(0.109) (0.109) (0.108)
APD7
0.032 0.032 0.031
(0.077) (0.077) (0.077)
APD14
0.033 0.033 0.032
(0.041) (0.041) (0.041)
APD21
−0.069 −0.069 −0.071
(0.062) (0.062) (0.061)
m(t) spline spline spline
Flight FEs X X
d.o.w. flight FEs X
d.o.w. purchase FEs X
obs 80, 550 80, 550 80, 550
R2 0.605 0.724 0.739
Route clustered standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
fixed cost to come back and check on fares. Since fares tend to increase over
time, the combined effect of these assumptions reduce the consumer problem to
a static choice of either purchasing a ticket the day the consumer’s travel plans
are realized, or not buying at all. Third, while in the actual airline business two
consumers buying on the same day might face different fares (e.g. from different
fare categories, or buying at different times of the day, or from different web sites),
in the model a single fare is offered to consumers each day. Fourth, I model con-
sumers as purchasing one-way tickets. A consumer interested in a round-trip can
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be thought of as two consumers interested in one-way tickets. As noted earlier, in
the collected data, round-trip fares are very close to the corresponding one-way
fares. Fifth, I assume firms utilize a finite set of fares. Firms take the set as given,
and choose a single fare to offer for each flight daily. This assumption captures the
fact that only a discrete number of fares is seen in the data. Next, I assume firms
do not oversell flights since most of the routes studied are operated by an airline
that does not oversell flights. If demand exceeds remaining capacity, tickets are
rationed. Finally, since most markets see one flight departure a day, I write down
the down with a single flight option. The model does extend to multiple flight
frequencies.
1.4.1 Consumer Problem
A market is defined as an origin, destination, search date, departure date. At time
t, M˜t ∈ N consumers arrive interested in traveling between the two cities.17 For
each of these newly-arrived consumers, all uncertainty about travel preferences is
resolved at this point. This assumption differs from Lazarev (2013) and earlier
theoretical work, including Gale and Holmes (1993), where consumer uncertainty
exists and this uncertainty can be resolved by delaying purchase until closer to
the departure date. In my model, when the date t consumers arrive, they choose
to either purchase a ticket on an available flight, exit the market, or pay a cost φ
to search again the following day. Throughout the rest of this section and when
estimating the model, I assume φ is sufficiently large so that waiting is never
optimal. In Section 1.6.3, I calculate a bound on φ for this assumption to hold,
and show that it is relatively small – since fares tend to increase, there is little
17More broadly, since M˜t is market specific, M˜t,d consumers look to travel on d, M˜t,d′ con-
sumers look to travel on date d′, etc.
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incentive to wait.
Preferences of consumers follow the earlier two-type consumer approach to
study airline markets (Berry, Carnall, and Spiller (1996) and Berry and Jia (2010)).
Consumer i is either a business traveler or a leisure traveler. With probability γt,
consumer i is a business traveler. Consumer i receives indirect utility from prod-
uct characteristics Xt ∈ RK and price pt. Let βi, αi denote the taste parameters
over Xt and pt, respectively. Let 0 denote the outside option. Each consumer i
receives idiosyncratic preference shocks for choosing to travel (εi1t). Let εi0t be
the taste shock for the outside option. Following the discrete choice literature,
consumer i chooses to fly iff
Ui1t(X, p, β, α, ε) ≥ Ui0t(X, p, β, α, ε).
I assume utility is linear in product characteristics and of the form
Ui1t = Xtβi − αipt + i1t.
Let εit = (εi0t, εi1t) be the idiosyncratic preference shocks for products in the
choice set for consumer i. Define yt =
(
αi, βi, εit
)
i∈1,..,M˜t to be the vector of
preferences for the consumers that enter the market. The demand for flight j at t
is a mapping given the fare offered (pt) and consumer preferences (yt), defined as
Qt(p, y) :=
M˜t∑
i=0
1
[
Ui1t ≥ Ui0t
]
7−→ {0, ..., M˜t},
where 1(·) denotes the indicator function.18
18Here, and for remainder of the paper, I suppress the dependence of Q on X to emphasize
the role of price. X may contain a flight characteristics such as whether a particular flight is a
27
Let st ∈ N denote the remaining capacity for the flight at time t. Demand is
integer-valued; however, it may be the case that more consumers want to travel
than there are seats remaining, i.e. Qt(p, y) > st. Since firms are not allowed to
oversell, in these instances, I assume remaining capacity is rationed by random
selection. If demand exceeds capacity for the flight, consumers that wanted to
travel are randomly shuﬄed. The first st are selected and the rest receive their
outside option.
Recall that a market is departure date-specific. Although the model assumes
consumers arrive and purchase a single one-way ticket, the model does allow for
round-trip ticket purchases in the following way. At time t, two consumers arrive.
One consumer is interested in leaving on date d, and another consumer is interested
in returning on date d′. The consumers receive idiosyncratic preference shocks for
each of the available flights, and choose which tickets to purchase. Since the
round-trip fares in the sample are very close to the sum of the corresponding
one-ways, there is little measurement error in this approach.
1.4.2 Monopoly Pricing Problem
A monopolist sells tickets for a single flight over a finite horizon. Period 0 corre-
sponds to the first period of sale, and t = T is the time at which the flights depart.
The flight has an initial capacity constraint of s0 seats, which is exogenous to the
model. I assume the cost of operation is sunk, so the only cost facing the firm is
the opportunity cost of selling seats. I assume the marginal cost per passenger
is zero, which is reasonable as almost all flight costs are not influenced by the
number of seats occupied.
morning or afternoon flight. In addition, X may contain an indicator for a particular departure
date which would allow the firm to use peak-load pricing.
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The firm maximizes expected discounted revenues. The firm knows on average
how many business and leisure travelers will search for tickets over time, but is
unsure exactly how many consumers will arrive in any given period. Since fares
are posted before consumers arrive, the firm forms expectation over present and
future revenues. The decision rule depends on the number of seats remaining,
number of periods left to sell, and an unobserved error term that the firm sees,
but the econometrician does not. This term, which is price specific, reflects the
fact that in data, there are flights in which the firm charges different prices given
the same number of seats remaining and time left to sell.19 Let ω denote this
term, which is separable from demand.
Since excess demand is rationed, by charging prices pt and receiving consumers
yt, the firm can sell at most min(Qt(p, y), st) seats. This implies the law of motion
for remaining capacity can be written as
st+1 = st −min
(
Qt(p, y), st
)
.
Define the incremental revenue for the firm to be
Rt(p, y, s) = min
(
Qt(p, y), st
)
· pt.
I assume the firm is restricted to choosing prices pt ∈ P . If the flight is has no
seats remaining, the price is infinite.
To write the firm’s problem as a dynamic program, define the value function,
Vt(s, ω) to be the discounted expected revenue left to go with remaining capacities
19The decision may also depend on other observed (at least to the firm) states Zt. Note
that X ⊂ Z since all product characteristics that enter the consumer problem affect purchasing
behavior, and consequently, affect expected revenues. Like X, I suppress the notation of Zt to
highlight the importance of remaining capacity st in the firm problem.
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st and t periods to sell. The restrictions on capacity form two boundary conditions
on the value function. The first is that with zero seats remaining, the firm cannot
capture additional revenue, which is Vt(0, ω) = 0. Second, unsold seats the day
the flights leave must be scrapped with zero value implying VT (s, ω) = 0.
The firm’s problem can be written recursively as
Vt(s, ω) = max
pt∈P
E
[
Rt(p, y, s) + ωp + ρVt+1(s
′, ω′ | y, s, ω)
]
s.t.

st+1 = st −min
(
Qt(p, y), st
)
VT (s, ω) = 0
Vt(0, ω) = 0
s0 given,
where ρ ∈ [0, 1] is the discount factor (which I set equal to 1).
The value function of the firm illustrates the important interactions between
intertemporal price discrimination and dynamic adjustment to stochastic demand.
If business consumers are less price sensitive and the proportion of business con-
sumers increases as the departure date approaches, the firm can extract more
revenue by increasing fares over time. However, since the arrival of consumers is
uncertain, it is possible that a flight may sell out early. This creates an incentive
for the firm to save seats until close to the departure date. Looking at the value
function, if capacity becomes scarce early on, the firm can increase fares to reduce
current period expected sales and revenues, but increase the probability that seats
will remain the following day. For example, if the firm sets pt =∞, then current
period expected revenues would be zero, but the probability that st = st+1 would
be one. Hence, the firm would enter the subsequent period under Vt+1(s, ω) which
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may be the optimal pricing strategy if the firm expects high-valuing consumers
to arrive closer to the departure date. Alternatively, it may be the case that the
firm receives a sequence of low demand realizations. In order to not leave as many
seats unfilled, the firm may opt to lower prices.
Recall I assume separability in demand and the unobserved error term. The
firm is uncertain about demand and forms expectation over yt. Expected sales for
the flight in any given period is
Qet (s, p) =
∫
yt
min
(
Qt(p, y), st
)
dF (yt).
By charging a price pt, the firm has a probability distribution over remaining
capacity tomorrow – which is integer valued. This means the dynamic program
of the firm can be written as
Vt(s, ω) = max
pt∈P
[
ptQ
e
t (s, p) + ωp + ρE[Vt+1(s′ω′|s, ω)]
]
= max
pt∈P
[
ptQ
e
t (s, p) + ωp + ρ
∫
ω′
st∑
j=0
Pr(st+1 = j | pt, st)Vt+1(j, ω′)dFω′
]
.
such that st+1 = st −min
(
Qt(p, y), st
)
and the two boundary conditions hold.
1.5 Econometric Specification & Estimation
I first parameterize the demand model and derive analytic expressions for pur-
chase probabilities. The firm’s pricing decision can be written as a dynamic dis-
crete choice model. In the last section, I discuss the estimation approach and
identification strategy.
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1.5.1 Consumer Demand
First I derive the purchase probabilities for the consumer demand system. Recall
that the preferences of consumers that arrive to the market are
yt =
(
αi, βi, εi
)
i∈1,..,M˜t .
The number of consumers, as well as the relative proportion of each type, that
will arrive is not observed by the firm before pricing (or by the econometrician).
In order to proceed, I integrate over the distribution of yt.
20
Assumption 1: Consumer idiosyncratic preferences are distributed Type-1 Ex-
treme Value (T1EV).
I assume the outside option yields a normalized utility ui0t = εi0t. The distri-
butional assumption on the idiosyncratic preferences leads to the frequently used
conditional logit demand system. Since there is only a single product in the choice
set,
ς i1t := Pr(i wants to purchase ticket |type = i) =
1
1 + exp(−Xtβi + αipt) .
The discrete choice literature typically does not model capacity constraints. Given
my environment, it is possible that consumers wish to purchase a product, but
are unable to due to a violation of the capacity constraint. As noted in the
previous section, if demand exceeds available capacity, demand is rationed, and
consumers who are not selected for travel receive their outside option. This
is why the purchase probabilities state “i wants to purchase ticket” instead of
20I proceed this way because individual decisions are not observed. Using the EM-algorithm
would be another way to address this issue. See: Talluri and Van Ryzin (2004) and Vulcano,
van Ryzin, and Chaar (2010).
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“i purchases ticket”. Let ς i0t denote the share of the outside option.
In practice, appropriate data to enter X would be variables such as if a flight
is operated on a holiday or weekend. Preferences over these characteristics could
also vary across consumer types and/or routes. While the model allows for these
covariates, I assume consumers only care about price, which is not unreasonable
as the routes studied are monopoly with a single flight daily.21
Assumption 2: There are two consumer types. Let B denote the business type
and L to denote the leisure type. The probability of a consumer being type-B
is γt. Then γts
B
t defines the probability that a consumer is of the business type
and wants to purchase a ticket. Consider the market share of the outside good at
time t. Conditional on k consumers arriving, the probability of zero consumers
wishing to travel is
Pr
(
Qt = 0 | k ∈ N
)
=
k∑
i=0
(
k
i
)(
(1− γt)ςL0t
)i(
γtς
B
0t
)k−i
.
For example, let k = 2. Then conditional on two consumers arriving, both con-
sumers want to purchase the outside option. Either both consumers are leisure
travelers, both consumers are business travelers, or one of each type arrive. The
first two situations correspond to i = 2 and i = 0, respectively since ((1−γ)ςL0t)2 is
the probability of two leisure consumers arriving and wanting to choose the out-
side option, and (γςB0t)
2 is the probability two business consumers want to choose
the outside option. Lastly, it could be the case that one business and one leisure
consumer arrives. There are two possibilities, the first consumer is the business
consumer, or vice versa. Hence, 2[(1− γ)ςL0t][γςB0t] enters the probability.
21When I solve the firm problem, adding additional characteristics makes the problem very
computationally demanding. I do allow all parameters to be route-specific.
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Next, integrating over the arrival process of consumers yields
Pr
(
Qt = 0
)
=
∞∑
k=0
Pr(Qt = 0, M˜t = k) =
∞∑
k=0
Pr(Qt = 0|M˜t = k)Pr(M˜t = k).
Assumption 3: Consumers arrive according to a Poisson process.22
Let M˜t ∼ Poisson(µt) denote the Poisson process. The probability mass func-
tion for the Poisson distribution is (µt)
ke−µt/k!, k ∈ N. With this assumption,
Pr
(
Qt = 0
)
has an analytic form and can be written as
Pr
(
Qt = 0
)
=
∞∑
k=0
µkt e
−µt
k!
k∑
i=0
(
k
i
)(
(1− γt)ςL0t
)i(
γtς
B
0t
)k−i
.
Implicitly, this depends on both price and capacity remaining. With zero seats
remaining, price is infinite so ςL0t = ς
B
0t = 1, which implies Pr
(
Qt = 0
)
= 1, as
expected. Next, consider the probability of selling a positive number of seats, but
not selling out, conditional on k. This probability can be written as
Pr
(
Qt = q | k ≥ q, q < s
)
=
(
k
q
) q∑
`=0
(
q
`
)(
γtς
B
1t
)`(
(1− γt)ςL1t
)q−`
×[
k−q∑
i=0
(
k − q
i
)(
(1− γt)ςL0t
)i(
γtς
B
0t
)k−q−i]
.
In the formula above, the terms following the first sum correspond to all the
combinations of having q consumers wanting to purchase a ticket. The terms
following the second summation (second line) correspond to all the combinations
of the remaining k−q consumers wanting to purchase the outside option. Finally,
kCq at the beginning of the equation sorts all the possible combinations of (want
22Given this assumption, the demand model closely follows Talluri and Van Ryzin (2004) and
Vulcano, van Ryzin, and Chaar (2010), except this model has two consumer types.
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to buy, do not want to buy) amongst the q of k consumers that wish to purchase
tickets. Of course, selling q seats requires at least k = q consumers to enter so
Pr(sell q | k < q, q < C, p) = 0. Integrating over the Poisson arrival process results
in an analytic expression for Pr(sell q | q < C, p), which is also a Poisson-Binomial
mixture.
Demand is latent in situations where flights are observed to sell out since it
is possible some consumers are forced to the outside option. These probabilities
can be constructed based off the fact that at least st seats are demanded. For
example, if st = 2 and the flight is observed to sell out, that implies at least 2
seats were demanded, which also has an analytic expression of a Poisson-Binomial
mixture. Since capacity is assumed to be monotonically decreasing, all purchase
probabilities have been defined, which appear in Equation 1.1 - Equation 1.3
below. Collectively call these probabilities f(s′|s, p, t).23
23To be clear, s′ denotes the number of seats sold in the current period given remaining
capacity s.
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. (1.3)
1.5.2 Solving the Firm’s Problem
The firm’s pricing decision depends on remaining capacity and time to sell. I
assume fares are chosen from a discrete set, which is exogenous to the model. I
define this set to be the set of observed fares in the data. This assumption accu-
rately reflects that fares for any given flight tend to fluctuate between relatively
few distinct prices. This assumption allows me to write down the firm’s problem
a dynamic choice choice model.
Following Rust (1987), I make the following assumptions:
Firm Assumptions:
(i) The choice shocks are distributed Type-1 Extreme Value (T1EV);
(ii) The per-period payoff function and choice shocks are separable;
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(iii) Conditional independence is satisfied.
These assumptions collectively lead to a dynamic discrete choice model, or more
specifically, a dynamic logit model. Due to conditional independence, the tran-
sition probabilities correspond to the probabilities derived in the last section.24
In addition, these functions also can be used to define the expected per period
revenues, since
∑
s′ f(s
′|s, p, t) · s′ = Qe(p, s).
Let Vt(s, ω) be the discounted expected revenue at state (st, ωt). Vt(s, ω) solves
Vt(s, ω) = max

vt(p
1, s) + ω(p1t )
vt(p
2, s) + ω(p2t )
...
vt(p
|P|, s) + ω(p|P|t )

,
where {vt(pk, s)}k∈1..|P(st)| are the choice specific value functions and can be written
as
vt(p
k, s) = Qet (s, p
k)pkt + ρEs′,ω′|s,pkV (s′, ω′)
= ERt(p
k, s) + EVt(p
k, s).
The T1EV assumption along with conditional independence imply the expected
value functions have a closed form and can be computed as
EVt(p, s) =
∫
s′
σ ln
 ∑
p′∈P(s′)
exp
(
ERt′(p
′, s′) + EVt′(p′, s′)
σ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=Vt+1(s′)
ft(s
′|s, p)ds′,
24That is, f(s′, ω′|s, ω, p, t) = f(ω′|s′, t)f(s′|s, p, t)
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where σ is the scale parameter the choice shocks (ω).25 Lastly, the assumptions
on the firm’s problem imply the conditional choice probabilities also have a closed
form and can be computed as
CPt(p, s) =
exp (ER(p, s) + EV (p, s)/σ)∑
p′∈P(st) (exp(ER(p
′, s) + EV (p′, s))/σ)
.
1.5.3 Estimation Approach
In this section, I discuss estimation of the structural parameters. There are two
possible approaches. The first strategy is to estimate the demand parameters
without accounting for the optimal choice in price. This strategy would rely
solely on the purchase probabilities derived in Section 1.5.1. However, as pointed
out in Talluri and Van Ryzin (2004), for a specific price, the quantity of tickets
sold in a given period can be higher either because of a higher overall arrival rate,
or because consumers become more inelastic for a given arrival rate. The second
approach is to estimate the model by accounting for the firm’s choice in price. I
take this approach and argue this information provides additional identification
power of the structural parameters.
To account for the firm’s pricing decision, I incorporate the dynamic discrete
choice model of the firm (Section 1.5.2). With the assumptions in Section 1.5.2,
given a set of flights (F ) each tracked for (T ) periods, the likelihood for the data
25Additionally,
vt(p, s) = ERt(p, s) + βEVt(p, s).
=
s∑
s′=0
f(s′|s, p, t)pts′ +
s∑
q=0
f(s′|s, p, t)Vt−1(s− s′)
=
s∑
s′=0
(
f(s′|s, p, t) ·
[
pts
′ + βVt−1(s− s′)
])
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is
L(data|θ) = max
θ
∏
F
∏
T
CP t(p, s)f(s
′|s, p, t).
Note that under the first strategy, the likelihood for the data is
∏
F
∏
T f(s
′|s, p, t).
By accounting for the firm’s pricing decision, the likelihood is disciplined through
the conditional choice probabilities, and that Bellman’s equation is satisfied. One
thing to note is that the parameters in the transition probabilities and the pa-
rameters in the per-period payoff function, which enter CP , are the same – they
are both functions of θ. For this reason, the transition probabilities cannot be
estimated in a first stage (which would be just estimating the consumer demand
model), as is typically done using this framework, and in alternative methods of es-
timating dynamic models, including Hotz and Miller (1993) and Bajari, Benkard,
and Levin (2007).
To estimate the structural parameters of the model, I solve the dynamic pro-
gram of the firm using mathematical programming with equilibrium constraints
(MPEC) (see Su and Judd (2012)). The estimation procedure equates to solving
the constrained maximization problem
max
θ,EV
∑
F
∑
T
ln(CP t(p, s)) + ln(f(s
′|s, p, t))
such that EV = T (EV, θ).
Recall that the arrival rate (µ) and mixture of consumer types (γ) is allowed
to change over time. I specify both sets of parameters to be continuous functions
in time. I assign the Poisson arrival rates (µ) to be a 4th-degree polynomial series.
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For the probability on types, I specify γ as a logistic function,
γt =
exp(γ1 + γ2t)
1 + exp(γ1 + γ2t)
, γ2 ≥ 0
This functional form assumption implies γt ∈ (0, 1),∀t and that the probability
of being a business consumer is increasing over time. However, this specification
does not require the proportion of business consumers to strictly increase over
time as γ2 = 0 is allowed.
Since the firm knows the demand elasticities of consumers as well as the arrival
process, studying the firm’s incentives to set prices given remaining capacity and
time to sell relays important information regarding the structural parameters. By
solving the firm’s dynamic program, I recover the shadow price of capacity across
time and the pricing policy functions of the firm, which through the markup rule,
informs the demand elasticity across time. Random demand results in variation
in sales for a given number of seats remaining and time left to sell, which informs
the arrival process parameters.
1.6 Results
In this section, I discuss the parameter estimates and the fit of the model. I then
discuss how the estimated pricing policies relate to theory on dynamic pricing.
Finally, I return to the assumption that the cost for consumers to search again
the next period is sufficiently high that waiting is never optimal. I show only
a small transactions cost is needed to make this assumption valid. In the next
section, I conduct the counterfactual exercises.
40
1.6.1 Model Estimates and Fit
I estimate the model by city pair. I utilize observations for the last 45 days prior to
departure, as average prices are relatively constant and bookings are low between
45 and 60 days prior to departure, and it greatly eases the computational burden
of solving the dynamic program. Here I discuss the results for one city pair, which
I use to conduct the counterfactual exercises in the next section.
Table 1.3: Parameter Estimates
Parameter Point Estimate SE
Price Sens.
αL −0.0128∗∗∗ 0.000141
αB −0.0048∗∗∗ 0.000165
Pr(business)
γ1 8.352
∗∗∗ 0.344
γ2 −0.214∗∗∗ 0.0124
Poisson Process
µ1 8.870
∗∗∗ 0.0501
µ2 0.102
∗∗∗ 0.00833
µ3 0.0037
∗∗∗ 0.000404
µ4 −0.00015∗∗∗ 5.750e-05
Pseudo LogLike -44398
eDL −4.254
eDB −1.397
a
Standard errors calculated using block bootstrap, n = 10, 440.
Parameter estimates appear in Table 1.3. All parameters are significant at the
1% level. The parameter estimates imply business consumers are over three times
less price sensitive than leisure consumers, and are willing to pay up to 75% more
in order to secure a seat. Figure 1.6 plots fitted values of the Poisson arrival rate
and probability on types across time. Estimates of the arrival rate start around
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eight persons per flight 45 days prior to departure. The process peaks roughly
three weeks prior to departure with a rate just under 12 persons per flight. From
there, the potential market decreases in time with the lowest arrival of consumers
appearing the day before departure. Here the arrival rate is just under 8 persons
per flight.
Figure 1.6: Fitted values of the arrival process: probability on consumer types
and Poisson rates.
The model estimates suggest a large shift in the makeup of consumers across
time. More than a month prior to departure, the share of business travelers is close
to zero. Starting at approximately two weeks prior to departure, corresponding
to the 14-day advance purchase discount, the share of business consumers in the
market increases dramatically from 20% fourteen days to nearly 80% the day
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before departure.
Figure 1.7: Comparison of model prices with observed prices.
Figure 1.7 plots the median model fares and observed fares by day before
departure.26 The plot shows that the model fares are quite similar to observed
fares, with differences of usually less than $25 between 45 and 10 days prior to
departure. The model accurately picks up the increasing pattern of fares within
three weeks of the departure date. The model predicts fares to increase to their
highest levels between seven to three days prior to departure, whereas in the data,
the highest fares occur over the last five days prior to departure. With model
prices, flights with excess capacity result in fire-sales, with the 50% percentile
decreasing nearly $75. The reason for this last-minute decline in prices is that
26Mean fares appear in the counterfactuals.
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there is no value of holding capacity in the last period. Recall in the data fire-sales
do occur – roughly 10% of the time, but presumably, fire-sales do not occur more
often because otherwise business consumers would learn that delaying purchase
results in lower fares.
1.6.2 Optimal Pricing
Figure 1.8 plots the optimal pricing policies and expected revenues for the firm
as a function of remaining capacity. The left panel plots the optimal price given
remaining capacity for three selected periods, corresponding to 15, 30, and 45 days
prior to departure. The right plot indicates the expected revenues associated with
remaining capacities for these three periods.
Figure 1.8: Estimated policy functions and expected revenues
The right panel shows that expected revenues are increasing in capacity for
a given period. Second, the panel shows that expected revenues are increasing
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in time to sell for a given capacity. These results are consistent with the theory
on dynamic pricing found in Gallego and Van Ryzin (1994). Expected revenues
flatten out for a given period because the firm cannot capture additional revenue
when there is sufficiently high capacity remaining. The plot shows that the prob-
ability of a sell out is close to zero if the firm has at least 30 seats remaining with
15 days left to sell. With 30 days remaining, there is excess capacity when at least
55 seats are remaining.
The left panel plots the policy function of the firm, p(s, t) for a given unob-
servable shock ω. As already mentioned, with 30 seats remaining and 15 days left
to sell, the probability of a sell out is close to zero. In return, the firm charges
a low price. However, the price charged by the firm with 30 seats remaining is
increasing in time to sell; that is, p(30, 15) < p(30, 30) < p(30, 45). This result
is driven by the complementarity between intertemporal price discrimination and
dynamic adjustment to stochastic demand when business consumers arrive close
to the departure date. With additional time to sell for a given capacity, the prob-
ability of a sell out increases and in particular, there is an increased probability
that a sell out would occur under a low price before business consumers become
active. By charging a higher price early on when capacity is expected to be scarce,
the firm can save seats for the high-valuing consumers who arrive late.
1.6.3 Allowing Consumers to Wait
The demand model assumes that waiting is never optimal. This assumption was
motivated by the fact that there are no discontinuities in bookings immediately
before advance purchase discounts expire. In this section, I study the incentives
of consumers to wait in purchasing tickets.
I change the model in the following way: after consumers arrive, each consumer
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has the option to either buy a ticket, choose not to travel, or wait one additional
day to decide. By choosing to wait, each consumer retains her private valuations
(the ε’s) for traveling but may be offered a new price tomorrow. Consumers do
not have perfect foresight, so they forecast both fares and remaining capacity for
the next period. Additionally, each consumer has to pay a transactions cost φi to
wait. This cost reflects the disutility consumers incur when needing to return to
the market the next period. The goal of this section is to derive a waiting cost φ
such that if all consumers have a waiting cost at least as high as φ, then no one
will wait. I then calculate the waiting cost in the data.27
Dropping the i subscript, the choice set of a consumer arriving at time t in a
model of waiting is
max
{
ε0, β − αpt + ε1, EUwait(p, s)− φ
}
,
where EUwait is the expected value of waiting and can be written as
EUwait(p, s) = Ep′|p,s
[
max{ε0, β − αpt−1 + ε1}
]
,
To derive φ, I first investigate the decision to wait for the marginal consumer, or
a consumer such that ε0 = β − αpt + ε1. This consumer has no incentive to wait
if the price tomorrow is at least as high as today. If price drops, the gain from
27For the proceeding analysis, I assume capacity is infinite. This means φ is not the lower
bound on waiting costs because the probability of not getting a seat creates an additional
incentive to not wait, i.e. there is a positive probability of being offered an infinite price. By
ignoring capacity, the consumer does not forecast the arrival process, or make decisions due to
possible rationing.
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waiting is
ut−1 − ut = (β − αpt−1 + ε1)− (β − αpt + ε1)
= α(pt − pt−1),
which implies the expected gains from waiting are Pr (pt−1 < pt)E[α(pt−pt−1) | pt−1 <
pt]. Hence, an indifferent consumer will not wait if
φi > φ := Pr (pt−1 < pt)E[α(pt − pt−1) | pt−1 < pt].
Proposition 1: With φ := Pr (pt−1 < pt)E[α(pt − pt−1), then all consumers will
choose not to wait.
Proof:
Take a consumer such that ε0 < β − αpt + ε1. Then there exists a p > p such
that ε0 = β − αp+ ε1. The expected gain for this consumer waiting isPr (pt−1 < pt)E[α(pt − pt−1) | pt−1 < pt]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=φ
+ Pr (pt < pt−1 ≤ p)E[α(pt − pt−1) | pt < pt−1 ≤ p]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
−φ
 ≤ 0,
which shows that a consumer that prefers to purchase today would not wait
under the defined φ. Next, consider a consumer such that ε0 > β−αpt+ε1. Then
there exists a p < pt such that ε0 = β − αp + ε1. The expected gain from this
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consumer waiting is
E[gain] =
(
Pr(pt−1 < p)E[β − αpt−1 + ε1 − ε0 | pt−1 < p]
−Pr (pt−1 < pt)E[α(pt − pt−1) | pt−1 < pt]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=φ
 ≤ 0,
≤ Pr(pt−1 < pt)
[
E[β − αpt−1 + ε1 − ε0 | pt−1 < p]− E[α(pt − pt−1) | pt−1 < pt]
]
≤ Pr(pt−1 < pt)
[
E[β − αpt−1 + ε1 − ε0 | pt−1 < p]− E[α(pt − pt−1) | pt−1 < p]
]
= Pr(pt−1 < pt)
[
E[β − αpt−1 + ε1 − ε0 − α(pt − pt−1) | pt−1 < p]
= Pr(pt−1 < pt)
[
E[β + ε1 − ε0 − αpt | pt−1 < p]
= Pr(pt−1 < pt)Pr(pt−1 < p) [β − αpt + ε1 − ε0]︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0 by assumption
≤ 0.
Hence, a consumer that prefers the outside option today would also not wait. 
In monetary terms, φ˜ = φ/α = Pr (pt−1 < pt)E[(pt − pt−1) | pt−1 < pt] defines
the the transaction cost a consumer would have to face in order to never wait.
These statistics can be calculated in the data. Figure 1.9 plots φ˜ across time
using the model estimates. I find that the average transactions cost required to
make consumers not wait to be $5.49. For many days, the transactions required
to make consumers not wait is close to zero. Notably, φ˜ is higher close to the
departure date as there are greater incentives to wait under model prices. In
particular, business consumers who arrive the day before departure must incur a
high waiting cost to persuade them not to wait. By waiting, they can capture
fire-sale prices.
The calculated waiting costs suggest that the assumption that consumers do
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Figure 1.9: Plot of mean transactions costs that would induce consumers not to
wait
not dynamically substitute is very reasonable for almost all days prior to depar-
ture. The result is driven by the upward price trend. Since prices tend to increase,
there is little incentive to wait a day to purchase once consumers first learn about
their interest in travel. Further, while the required transaction cost is high close
to the departure date, this analysis analyzed the indifferent consumer. Consumers
who prefer to either purchase or not purchase would require a lower cost to not
wait.
1.7 Analysis of the Estimated Model
In this section, I use the estimated model to examine three issues. In Section
6.1, I first perform three exercises that reduce the firm’s ability to price discrim-
inate. I investigate uniform pricing, dynamic pricing but restrict the number of
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price changes, and a pricing system which depends on date of purchase, but not
remaining capacity. Section 6.2 uses the estimated model to highlight the com-
plementarity between intertemporal price discrimination and stochastic demand
pricing. Finally, in Section 6.3, I show how estimation approaches that do not
take into account stochastic demand will systematically produce biased estimates
of the degree to which demand becomes more inelastic as the departure date
approaches.
For each exercise, I use the empirical distribution of remaining capacity 45 days
prior to departure as the initial capacity condition.28 I maintain the assumption
that prices are chosen from the price set observed in the data. Relaxing this
assumption so that prices are continuous yields qualitatively similar findings. For
each counterfactual, I calculate the following benchmarks:
• Fare : overall mean fare for flights that have not sold out;
• LF : mean load factor the day flights leave;
• Sell outs : percent of flights that sell out after the last pricing period;
• Rev : mean revenue across flights;
• CSL : mean leisure consumer surplus;
• CSB : mean business consumer surplus;
• SW : mean daily welfare across flights (less sunk costs).
28I simulate 100,000 flights using this distribution. This provides an initial capacity condition
between 6 and 83 seats. This controls for the fact that I model pricing for the last 45 days prior
to the departure date. With just six seats remaining, the probability of selling out exceeds 85%
under dynamic pricing versus less than 5% for a a flight with 83 seats.
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1.7.1 The Welfare Effects of Flexible Pricing
In the model, the firm can set prices flexibly over time, to respond to changes in
the consumer composition, and in response to random realizations of demand. At
the opposite extreme is a pricing system that sets a uniform price over the entire
time period. This subsection compares these extreme cases: dynamic pricing to
uniform pricing. I also examine an intermediate case, where prices depend upon
time to departure, but not on random fluctuations in demand. By comparing
uniform to the intermediate case, and the intermediate to the full, the following
analysis separates out the gains from intertemporal price discrimination from the
gains to adjusting to stochastic demand.
Uniform Pricing
I start by removing the firm’s ability to adjust prices as the departure date ap-
proaches. The firm maximizes expected revenues subject to the constraint that
it must charge a uniform price across time. The price is solely dependent on the
initial capacity condition.
Under uniform pricing, a high fare ensures the firm can successfully secure
seats for business consumers, but doing so prices leisure consumers out of the
market. At the same time, going after only the business market results in unused
capacity which can be filled by lowering the fare. The optimal pricing strategy is
one that balances saving seats for the high-valuing customers who arrive close to
the departure date along and filling seats that would otherwise be scrapped.
Results for the counterfactual appear in Table 1.4. The left panel plots mean
fare, weighted by initial capacity, across time for flights that have not yet sold
out. The plot shows that the uniform price is higher relative to dynamic prices
well in advance of the departure date. An optimal uniform fare of nearly $200
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Table 1.4: Dynamic vs. Uniform Pricing
Policy / Mean Fare LFf Sell outs Revf CSiL CS
i
B SW
t
Dynamic $208.70 95.69% 28.65% $9, 956.51 $52.59 $171.97 $955.85
Uniform $197.62 91.87% 40.46% $9, 299.37 $51.46 $184.50 $951.35
Difference (%) -5.30% -3.82% 11.81% -6.60% -2.15% 7.29% −
means only leisure consumers with high private valuations actually purchase. The
fare is sufficiently high that the firm can save (some) seats for the high-valuing
consumers who arrive close to the departure date.
The fact that fares are relatively higher under uniform pricing early on, but
relatively lower closer to the departure date results in a significant reallocation of
capacity across time. This is shown in the right panel, which plots the booking
curve, or mean cumulative seats sold, towards the departure date. The uniform
pricing booking curve is bowed out as fewer consumers purchase under the rel-
atively higher fare early on. Relatively lower fares close to the departure date
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results in a higher booking rate compared to dynamic pricing through the day
of departure. However, even with this increase in the booking rate, the overall
load factor for flights under uniform pricing is lower than dynamic pricing. I find
that 17% fewer seats are purchased by leisure consumers under uniform pricing.
At the same time, nearly 17% more seats are booked by business consumers un-
der uniform pricing. Since more leisure consumers purchase tickets than business
consumers, the net change in bookings under uniform pricing is negative.
There is also a large reallocation within consumer type. Figure 1.10 plots
the fraction of consumer types that purchase conditional on entering the market
(i.e. number of consumers that buy / number of consumers that enter). The
left panel shows that under dynamic pricing, the purchase rate amongst leisure
consumers is close to 11% well before the departure date. As prices increase under
dynamic pricing, very few leisure consumers purchase. On the other hand, under
uniform pricing, fares are high early on resulting in a 33% decline in purchases
by leisure consumers. The take up rate is constant, but also declines towards
the departure date. This is because under uniform pricing, many flights sell out
in advance. For business consumers, the lower fares offered by uniform pricing
results in higher purchasing rates across all periods. Again, the uniform pricing
rate declines towards the departure date since many flights sell out in advance.
The change in allocation under uniform pricing is mitigated because of two
forces. First, as discussed above, uniform pricing implies leisure consumers with
high private valuations purchase throughout time, whereas under dynamic pric-
ing essentially no leisure consumers purchase when fares go over $250. While
leisure consumers are made worse off due to high prices early on, it also means
some successfully purchase closer to the departure date and overall, leisure con-
sumer surplus decreases over 2% under uniform pricing. Second, while business
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Figure 1.10: Purchasing rates across consumer types and time
consumers benefit from lower prices, the increase in business consumer surplus
is mitigated because of the increased number of early sell outs. An important
consequence of uniform pricing is that the firm cannot control the booking rate
of flights that turn out to be popular. Uniform pricing increases sell outs by 12%,
which consequently forces more late-arriving business consumers to the outside
option. Hence, business consumer surplus increases 7% under uniform pricing.
On average, leisure consumer welfare declines and business consumer welfare
increases under uniform pricing. Overall, I find consumer welfare is 1.36% higher
under uniform pricing compared to dynamic pricing. The consumer welfare gains
in the absence of price discrimination are relatively modest as a result of inefficient
capacity allocation. Further, compared to dynamic pricing, revenues fall 6.6%
under uniform pricing. As airlines operate razor thin margins, the decline in
revenues is significant, and suggests the firm would probability choose to exit the
market in the long run. Moreover, total welfare is lower under uniform pricing
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compared to dynamic pricing.
The Role of Frequent Price Adjustments
The previous exercise compared the extremes in pricing capabilities of the firm –
either the firm maintains a single price across time, or the firm can update prices
daily. Now I allow the firm to use dynamic pricing, with the restriction that prices
must be maintained for k days. I conduct four counterfactuals, corresponding to
k = 3, 5, 9, 15. The idea here is that dynamic pricing is clearly valuable to the
firm, but it is not necessarily true that daily price adjustments are needed to
obtain the revenues observed under (daily) dynamic pricing.
Figure 1.11: Comparing different degrees of dynamic pricing
Figure 1.11 plots the revenue loss compared to the baseline case of daily price
adjustments, for the four counterfactuals. For example, while uniform pricing re-
duces revenue by 6.6% compared to daily dynamic pricing, the ability to update
prices every 15 days increases revenue by over 1%. The difference in revenues
55
between 15 day adjustments and 9 day adjustments is quite large. I find that rev-
enues are 1.1% lower under 5-day adjustments compared to daily dynamic pricing.
Under 3-day adjustments, revenues are 0.5% less than under daily adjustments.
There are two ways to interpret these results. The first is that while 9 and 15 day
adjustments result in significant revenue declines, adjustments made at 3 and 5
day intervals result in revenues similar to daily adjustments. At the same time,
even under 3-day adjustments, revenues are nearly half a percent lower compared
to daily adjustments. As reported by the IATA (2013), the margins for airlines are
very small (around 1%), suggesting that even the losses associated with 3 and 5
day adjustments would lead to a significant decline in profits in percentage terms.
The Use of Intertemporal Price Discrimination Alone
I next single out the intertemporal price discrimination force by investigating
pricing policies which depend on day until departure, but not on the scarcity of
seats. Viewed from the dynamic pricing perspective, this counterfactual investi-
gates pricing with the dynamic adjustment force shut down and thus, quantifies
the complementarity between the two pricing forces. Specifically, this counter-
factual quantifies the additional revenue gains possible by dynamically adjusting
fares.
Under intertemporal price discrimination alone the optimal sequence of fares,
p∗, solves
max
p∈×Tt=0P
Ey
[∑
t
min
{
Qt(p, y) , st+1 −min
(
Qt+1(p, y), st+1
)}
pt
∣∣∣ sT] ,
where st+1 − min
(
Qt+1(p, y), st+1
)
≡ st is the capacity remaining after the pre-
vious period’s demand is realized and sT is the initial capacity condition. The
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decision space of the firm’s problem has cardinality |P|T . I simplify the problem
by adding the restriction that the firm only adjusts fares on the usual advance
purchase discount days – 3, 7, 14, and 21 days prior to departure.29
Table 1.5: Dynamic vs. Intertemporal Price Discrimination
Policy / Mean Fare LF Sell outs Rev CSL CSB SW
Dynamic $208.70 95.69% 28.65% $9, 956.51 $52.59 $171.97 $955.85
Discrim. Only $205.94 90.01% 31.43% $9, 608.13 $52.01 $171.54 $942.29
Difference (%) -1.32% -5.68% 2.78% -3.49% -1.01% -.25% −
Results for this counterfactual appear in Table 1.5. The time path of prices
under intertemporal price discrimination alone are monotonically increasing, with
a substantial increase in fares when crossing the 14-day advance purchase dis-
count. This corresponds to the increase in proportion of business consumers given
29I have also investigated the pricing decision over |P|T using simulated annealing. I obtain
similar findings compared to this setup.
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the model estimates. The fares offered to leisure consumers well before the de-
parture date are slightly higher under intertemporal price discrimination alone.
The reason for this is because without dynamic adjustment, there is an additional
incentive for the firm to reserve capacity for business consumers. In order to do
this, the firm charges higher prices early on, which decreases the number of seats
purchased by leisure consumers compared to dynamic pricing.
Importantly, as the pricing becomes more flexible, the fares offered early on
are lower. Fares under intertemporal price discrimination alone are substantially
lower than uniform pricing well in advance of the date of travel. Under dynamic
pricing, fares are even lower. The point where leisure consumers stop purchasing
is similar under both intertemporal price discrimination and dynamic pricing, and
as a result, overall leisure consumer surplus has the following order: CSdynamicL >
CSdiscrim.L > CS
uniform
L . That is overall, but within consumer type there is also
a reallocation, and the ordering is reversed for the leisure consumers that arrive
closer to the departure date. Business consumer surplus is essentially unchanged
as prices are either higher or lower under dynamic pricing depending on when
they arrive. Moreover, without dynamic adjustment, firms have a reduced ability
to save seats for late-arriving business consumers, which results in a 2.8% increase
in sell outs.
Not only is consumer surplus (marginally) higher under dynamic pricing, rev-
enues are substantially higher. Revenues under intertemporal price discrimina-
tion alone are 3.5% lower compared to dynamic pricing.30 These results demon-
strate there is a significant complementarity between the pricing channels. Allow-
ing firms to adjust prices dynamically results in additional revenues from early-
arriving leisure consumers. At the same time, dynamic adjust allows airlines to
30Revenue Management Overview states revenue management systems have increased airline
revenues by 3-9%.
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secure seats on flights that are realized to have high demand. When the business
consumers arrive, they receive higher fares compared to pricing under intertempo-
ral price discrimination alone. In terms of value, these results suggest 50% of the
revenue gains associated with dynamic pricing over uniform pricing comes from
dynamic adjustment.
1.7.2 The Complementarity of Intertemporal Price Dis-
crimination and Stochastic Demand Pricing
This subsection shows how intertemporal price discrimination and stochastic de-
mand pricing are complements in the airline industry. It arises because of the
particular pattern of consumer arrival. The consumers who arrive last are the
ones with the highest willingness to pay, which creates an incentive for firms to
save seats until close to the departure date. If seats become scarce early on, the
firm’s optimal pricing strategy is to sharply increase fares, which reduces the rate
at which seats are sold. With capacity reserved, the firm then price discriminates
toward the late-arriving consumers by charging them high fares.
The point about this complementarity can be made with a simple example.
Consider a reversal of the arrival process, where high-valuing consumers arrive
first. In particular, suppose there are three periods and a flight has two seats.
In each period, a consumer arrives with a 50/50 probability. In the first period
(t = 1), if the consumer arrives, the reservation price is $1000. For the remaining
two periods (t = 2, 3) the reservation price is $200. In this environment, the profit
maximizing policy is to set p1 = 1000 and p2 = 200, and p3 = 200. There is no
need for price to respond to demand since the high-valuing consumer is guaranteed
a seat. In this case, there are no gains to having a pricing system that reacts to
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demand realizations.
Now reverse the order of arrival so that in the first two periods, the reservation
price is $200, and in the last period, the reservation price is $1,000. Under dynamic
pricing, the firm will charge a price of $200 in the first period. If a seat sells, the
firm will set a price p2 > 200, and finally, will set a price of $1,000 in the last
period. If the seat does not sell, the firm will charge p2 = 200 and p3 = 1000,
which yields an expected profit of $650.31. However, if prices are not allowed to
respond to demand, the firm will set up a fare schedule that reserves the seat for
the potential business consumer. By charging (p1, p2, p3) = (∞, 200, 1000), the
firm has expected revenues of $600. Hence, the airline would be willing to pay up
to $50 to utilize a pricing system that responds to demand realizations.
This simple example demonstrates the importance of dynamic adjustment
when high-valuing consumers arrive last. In particular, it is important that air-
lines price to keep seats available until close to the departure date. To get a sense
of the magnitude of this force for the airline industry, I perform the same exercise
above using the estimated model. I reverse the arrival process of consumers and
compare revenues under dynamic pricing with a pricing system that only depends
on the date of purchase. Note that if the arrival process was constant, and the
mix of consumer types did not change over time, reversing the order would have
no effect on revenues. Thus the magnitude of the difference will depend upon how
stochastic demand is, and the extent to which elasticity varies. Both of these are
pinned down in the estimation exercise.
31If the seat sells, the expected revenues for the remaining period are $500. If the seat does
not sell, the expected revenues are 1/2 · 200 + 1/2 · 1000. Hence, ER = 1/2(200) + 1/2(500) +
1/2(1/2 · 200 + 1/2 · 1000) = 650
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Reversal of the Arrival Process
Table 1.6 presents the counterfactual results of dynamic pricing, intertemporal
price discrimination alone, and uniform pricing when the arrival process is re-
versed. Compared to when business consumers arrive late (observed arrival pro-
cess), a reversal of the arrival process brings: lower fares, higher load factors,
more sell outs, and increased revenues (see Table 1.7 for comparisons). Overall
consumer surpluses are also higher under a reversal of the arrival process, with
the exception of leisure consumer surplus under uniform pricing, which is lower,
but very close to the observed arrival process.
Table 1.6: Reversal of the arrival process
Policy / Mean Fare LF Sell outs Rev CSL CSB SW
Dynamic $205.61 96.69% 49.67% $10, 086.01 $52.86 $172.60 $959.78
Discrim. Only $204.89 93.72% 48.79% $9, 851.89 $52.55 $172.46 $951.69
Uniform $196.53 91.96% 40.83% $9, 304.30 $51.34 $190.20 $957.15
With a reversal of the arrival process, firms have no incentive to hold remaining
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capacity. This is particularly noticeable under intertemporal price discrimination
alone. Under the reversed arrival process, leisure consumers who arrive within 21
days of the departure date receive fares that are $10-$20 lower on average. Fares
increase slightly under dynamic pricing closer to the departure date for flights
with scarce capacity, driving up mean fares. Flights that have not already sold out
result in fare-sales the day before departure as the firm tries to fill any remaining
open seats. The lower prices offered with a reversed arrival process result in
substantially higher sell outs. As shown in Table 1.7, the ordering of percent of
sell outs is reversed under the two arrival processes. The percent of sell outs under
dynamic pricing nearly doubles. Under intertemporal price discrimination alone,
sell outs are 17% higher.
Table 1.7: Comparing Arrival Processes
Policy Arrival / Mean Fare LF Sell outs Rev
Dynamic Reversed $205.61 96.69% 49.67% $10, 086.01
Observed $208.70 95.69% 28.65% $9, 956.51
Discrim. Only Reversed $204.89 93.72% 48.79% $9, 851.89
Observed $205.94 90.01% 31.43% $9, 608.13
Uniform Reversed $196.53 91.96% 40.83% $9, 304.30
Observed $197.62 91.87% 40.46% $9, 299.37
The most important feature of the reversed arrival process is the role of in-
tertemporal price discrimination. While revenues are $100 greater per flight with
dynamic pricing across arrival processes and only $5 per flight more under uniform
pricing, the difference in revenues under intertemporal price discrimination alone
is $250 across arrival processes. The other relevant measure is the revenue across
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policies within arrival process. As previously discussed, 50% of the revenue gains
of using dynamic pricing over uniform pricing can be attributed to intertemporal
price discrimination. The remaining can be attributed to dynamic adjustment.
However, when the arrival process is reversed, 75% of the revenue gains can be
attributed to intertemporal price discrimination. The reason for this is because
the role of dynamic adjustment is unique to the arrival process. When business
consumers arrive late, dynamic adjustment is used to reserve capacity across time.
With business consumers arriving early, firms can capture their willingness to pay
solely through the intertemporal price discrimination channel. The role of dy-
namic adjustment is simply to fill remaining seats after the business market is
served.
Constant Arrival Process
The last counterfactual demonstrated the importance of dynamic adjustment in
complementing intertemporal price discrimination when business consumers arrive
late. The counterfactual also established that the role of dynamic adjustment is
unique to the arrival process. In this counterfactual, I investigate pricing under a
constant arrival process. Demand is still stochastic, but the mix of consumers that
arrive over time is held constant. This shuts down the use of the intertemporal
price discrimination channel. In this environment, prices adjust across time solely
due to the scarcity of seats under stochastic demand.
Figure 1.12 plots the mean price under dynamic pricing and uniform pricing
under constant arrival.32 Notably, instead of prices increasing over time, prices
simply fluctuate around the levels offered under uniform pricing. Fares increase
32Under constant arrival, I take the probability of a consumer being of the business type to
be the mean of γˆ for all periods
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Figure 1.12: Pricing under a constant arrival process
for flights that are realized to be scarce close to the departure date in a similar
fashion to the dynamic pricing policies under the reversed arrival process. Flights
are then offered under fire-sale prices as to not leave as many seats unfilled. One
of the predictions found in Gallego and Van Ryzin (1994) is that the value of
dynamic pricing is lower under constant arrival. My empirical findings support
this theory. While revenues increase 6.6% by using dynamic pricing over uniform
pricing under observed arrival, the revenue gains under constant arrival are half
of that.
1.7.3 Consequences of Abstracting from Stochastic De-
mand
In this section, I illustrate that in order to conduct welfare analysis in markets
where both the intertemporal price discrimination and dynamic adjustment forces
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operate, it is important to take into account the uncertainty about demand. In
particular, by ignoring stochastic demand, an empirical analysis will fail to take
into account the opportunity cost of holding back capacity tends to fall over time,
which leads to a systematic bias in estimating demand elasticities.
Consider the pricing of a single flight. Suppose demand is stochastic but the
empirical approach ignores the uncertainty about demand. In this case, the firm
faces a static problem which can be written as
max
p
∑
t
Qt(pt)pt s.t.
∑
t
Qt(pt) ≤ s.
Letting c(s) be the shadow price of capacity, the firm problem can be written as
the following unconstrained problem:33
max
p
∑
t
Qt(pt)pt − c(s)
(∑
t
Qt(pt)− s
)
⇔max
p
∑
t
Qt(pt)
(
pt − c(s)
)
+ c(s)s.
Letting c be the opportunity cost at the optimum, Lerner’s index reveals
pt − c
pt
=
1
eDt (pt)
,
where eDt (pt) ∈ R+. Rearranging terms to solve for price yields the markup rule,
pt =
eDt (pt)
eDt (pt)−1
c. Then, taking the ratio of prices over time, in this case with the
33Here I assume price is not restricted to the discrete set of fares, otherwise the firm problem
is an integer programming problem.
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first period, reveals
pt
pT
=
eDt (pt)
eDt (pt)−1
c
eDT (pT )
eDT (pT )−1
c
=
eDt (pt)
eDt (pt)−1
eDT (pT )
eDT (pT )−1
. (Ignoring stochastic demand)
In the equation above, the opportunity costs cancel which reveals that information
on prices directly relate to elasticity ratios. On the other hand, when accounting
for stochastic demand, the opportunity cost changes over time and the terms do
not cancel. Instead,
pt
pT
=
e˜Dt (pt)
e˜Dt (pt)−1
ct
e˜DT (pT )
e˜DT (pT )−1
cT
. (Accounting for stochastic demand)
In particular, the opportunity cost of selling a given seat tends to be lower closer
to the departure date (ct ≤ cT ), because if a seat is not sold in the current period
there is less of a chance it will be sold in the future. As a result, an empirical
analysis ignoring stochastic demand will systematically understate the degree to
which the late arriving consumers are less price sensitive.
Figure 1.13 demonstrates this result, by plotting the relative elasticity ratios
when accounting for stochastic demand and when ignoring stochastic demand
using the model estimates. Notably, as the opportunity cost falls closer to the
departure date, the bias becomes significant.
1.8 Concluding Remarks
There are two broad rationales for product prices that change over time: segmen-
tation of consumers who differ in their willingness to pay, and changes in scarcity
– or shadow costs – arising from stochastic demand. In this paper, I study the
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Figure 1.13: Comparing elasticity ratios across time
interactions of these forces by investigating the pricing decisions of airlines in US
monopoly markets. I create a novel data set of high frequency fares and seat
availabilities to estimate a structural model of dynamic airline pricing. In the
model, firms face a stochastic arrival of consumers. The mix of consumer types,
corresponding to leisure and business travelers, changes over time.
I show dynamic adjustment to stochastic demand complements intertemporal
price discrimination in the airline industry. The complementarity arises because
price inelastic consumers tend to arrive close to the date of travel. I find there
are significant revenue losses associated with a pricing system that depends on
the date of purchase, but not on the random realizations of demand. There are
two reasons for this. First, dynamic adjustment allows firms to secure seats for
business consumers who arrive close to the departure date. These consumers are
then charged high prices. Second, dynamic adjustment reduces the incentive to
hold back capacity well before the date of travel. Firms offer lower fares early on
which results in additional revenue from leisure consumers who would otherwise
not purchase.
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Compared to pricing policies that depend only on the date of purchase, I find
dynamic adjustment increases consumer surplus. Leisure consumers benefit from
the lower fares offered early on. While business consumers face higher prices under
dynamic adjustment, the ability of firms to save seats reduces the probability of
an early sell out. This allows some business consumers to receive seats on flights
that would have been sold out otherwise.
One of the limitations of this study is that I only examine the pricing deci-
sions in monopoly markets. Recent research has suggested the ability of airlines
to respond to scarcity may be reduced in more competitive markets. An open
question would be to examine the complementarities in the pricing channels in
oligopoly markets. In addition to presence of multiple equilibria, this research
would have to address what information airlines know about their competitors.
Airlines surely keep track of competitor fares, but it is not clear that airlines keep
track of their competitors’ seat availabilities.
Chapter 2
Zone Pricing and Spatial Menu
Costs: Evidence from Drywall
2.1 Introduction
In the empirical industrial organization literature, the standard approach models
prices as being set at the market level. Competing firms in a particular market each
set a specific price for that market, taking as given the prices set by competing
firms. In practice, retail firms commonly set prices at the zone level. These
pricing zones, although usually geographically contiguous, often combine distinct
markets that may be hundreds of miles apart and that differ in significant ways. A
firm’s pricing zone might include urban and rural markets, markets with different
degrees of competition, and markets where input costs vary substantially. With
these differences across markets, we might expect the firm to set individual prices
in each market rather than a common price throughout the zone.
In this article, we develop an empirical analysis of zone pricing under com-
petition. While monopolists can only increase profits by adopting more granular
pricing policies, price discrimination theory has shown this is not necessarily the
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case in markets with competition. When competitors are present, a commitment
to not use more granular pricing may allow firms to obtain higher profits. We
explore this ambiguity by examining the zone pricing practices of the major home
improvement retailers. We explain a number of features of drywall retailing that
make it an ideal industry for such a study, and further we are able to construct
a unique, rich data set for this industry. We estimate a structural model of sup-
ply and demand, which we use to estimate equilibria under alternative pricing
regimes. We find profits increase if firms adopt more granular pricing. Since the
major retailers have chosen not to adopt these policies, they must face some ad-
ditional costs. We call these costs “spatial menu costs”, and our analysis finds
them to be substantial.
The spatial menu costs considered here relate in spirit to the concept of menu
costs prominent in the macroeconomics literature. The macro literature docu-
ments how prices change infrequently over time, and this inter-temporal price
rigidity has potentially significant implications for the macroeconomy. There are
also studies that examine the menu costs associated with price changes at the
micro level, such as for products within stores (see Levy, Bergen, Dutta, and Ven-
able (1997) for example). Here, the price rigidity is across space – a pricing zone.
Many of the key issues from the macro literature apply in our context.
Retail drywall markets have several features that aid analysis of zone pricing.
In the mainstream retail sector for drywall, competition is between a few large
chains, all of which practice zone pricing. Drywall, also known as wallboard or
gypsum board, is costly to transport, so consumers buy from local stores and
retailer costs vary geographically. The distribution centers for each major retail
chain have known locations, making costs estimable. Some observed pricing zones
span multiple, diverse markets, making advertising an unlikely reason for setting
such large pricing zones. Some pricing zones also include monopoly markets and
markets with multiple stores from each chain. The variation of costs, competition,
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and demand variables within a pricing region allow us to uncover the role of spatial
menu costs in forcing pricing zones.
Our work contributes to the literature on price discrimination, as spatial menu
costs are an interesting impediment to price discrimination. Firms have chosen
not to set completely uniform prices and so engage in limited price discrimina-
tion. We show that without spatial menu costs, drywall retailers would set a
discriminatory price in each market. In the standard monopoly setting, limiting
the firm to a zone system can only lower profits. However, Holmes (1989) and
Corts (1998) show that in environments where firms compete, the effect of being
able to price discriminate has an ambiguous effect on profit; impediments to price
discrimination limit what a particular firm can do, but it also affects what its
rivals are doing. In more recent work, Aguirre, Cowan, and Vickers (2010) and
Cowan (2012) explore sufficient conditions on demand for a third-degree price dis-
criminating monopolist to either increase or decrease social welfare and consumer
surplus, respectively. Chen and Schwartz (2013) examine the welfare implications
of differential pricing in a monopoly setting where there are differences in marginal
costs of serving consumer groups. Our empirical model allows for both demand
and cost-based rationales for differential pricing, and we quantify the impact of
zone pricing to both consumers and firms.
In order to examine the welfare implications of zone pricing in retail drywall,
we estimate a structural model of demand and supply using a new data set for
the industry. The two largest retail chains report prices and up-to-date inventory
levels; we difference reported inventory levels to derive daily sales. The sales data
allow estimation of a discrete-choice demand model. Consumers select between all
available drywall products at each nearby store from either chain. We find drywall
to be a highly substitutable product, but overall industry elasticity is very low.
We estimate the marginal cost of each product in each store by accounting for
transportation costs from the warehouse. With these demand and costs estimates,
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we can estimate profits under the current pricing zones and compare them to pre-
menu cost profits in counterfactual equilibria where one or both of the firms instead
use market level pricing. Multiple equilibria exist for a given zone configuration.
We compare the current regime with a small adjustment in zones to yield unique
counterfactual equilibria. Aggregating across markets, we find the spatial menu
costs to be 2.2% of current revenues. For the 128 stores in the sample, this
equates to roughly $4.6 million in additional profits for retail drywall annually.
Applying a selection mechanism across multiple equilibria on the meta game of
zone pricing yields a menu cost of nearly $2.3 million. The spatial menu costs
that would rationalize the chains’ decision not to separate stores into their own
pricing districts are substantial, though small enough that managerial effort costs
(as in Zbaracki, Ritson, Levy, Dutta, and Bergen (2004)) are a likely explanation.
Previous work on zone pricing is relatively sparse in both the economics and
marketing literature. Montgomery (1997), Chintagunta, Dube´, and Singh (2003),
and Khan and Jain (2005) are important exceptions. They all examine a su-
permarket chain that practices zone pricing and ask how profits and consumer
surplus would change if the chain switched from zone pricing to store-by-store
pricing. Marginal costs were assumed to be the same at all stores. Although this
is an acceptable abstraction for supermarkets within a city, such an assumption
cannot be maintained with drywall. An important difference between our work
and the previous literature is that instead of analyzing what is happening to one
firm in isolation, holding fixed the environment of the firm as it changes from zone
to store-by-store, we take into account how switching regimes can affect the entire
competitive interaction. We show the profit gains to using market level pricing
are greatly overstated when abstracting from effects of competition, causing the
menu costs to be overstated by as much as 32% or over $2.1 million annually for
the stores examined.
This article is organized as follows: In Section 2, we document zone pricing
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for the home improvement retail industry and describe the data used for this
study. In Section 3, we introduce the supply and demand system. In Section 4,
we present estimation results and in Section 5, we conduct analysis on alternative
pricing regimes.
2.2 Data and Descriptive Evidence
We create two new data sets for products sold at the largest home improvement
warehouse retailers in the United States. In Section 2.2.1, we describe the detailed
price and quantity data we use to estimate the empirical model in Section 2.4. We
construct a panel of daily prices and sales quantities for all drywall products offered
at 128 Home Depot and Lowe’s stores in the Intermountain West. To obtain sales
quantities, we monitor daily inventory levels reported on the retailers’ websites;
by differencing daily inventory levels, we obtain sales for each product-store pair.
In Section 2.2.2, we document the use of zone pricing throughout the retail
home improvement industry. We obtain a cross section of prices at all Home
Depot, Menards, and Lowe’s locations in the United States for several product
categories. While zone pricing is used in most of the product categories examined,
the size and character of the zones varies for different products. We describe what
features of the drywall data generalize to other product categories.
2.2.1 Drywall Data
Drywall prices posted on company websites reveal the use of zone pricing by
both Home Depot and Lowe’s. For both chains, prices on a given product vary
considerably at a national level, but are exactly the same price at all of the chain’s
stores within contiguous areas. These areas are largely the same for different
drywall products. We define a pricing zone as an area in which stores have exactly
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the same price on all products offered. We show that although most pricing zones
are small, some contain a large number of stores and span a diverse set of markets.
Price levels for regular 5/8” x 4’ x 8’ gypsum board are mapped at every
Lowe’s and at every Home Depot in Figure 2.1. Each dot on the map represents
a store, and its color represents its price intensity. Nationally this product has
considerable price variation, at between $5.98 a sheet to $20.35 a sheet for Home
Depot. In large geographical areas in the United States, such as every store
located in Idaho, there is no price variation. A similar pattern can be seen for
Lowe’s stores. For this particular sheet of drywall, Lowe’s charges 126 distinct
prices across its 1,714 stores in the United States. Surprisingly in some areas,
such as the Carolina Piedmont, a sharp boundary separates two zones with very
different prices. Elsewhere, such as the upper Midwest, prices are similar over a
wide area.
Figure 2.2 plots unique prices for a regular 5/8” x 4’ x 8’ gypsum board
product available at Home Depot stores in the Western United States. Each dot
again represents a store; stores with exactly the same price are the same color.
The figure shows geographically contiguous pricing zones. For example, there
is a unique price for this drywall product for all Home Depot stores in Oregon.
All locations in Utah and Southern Idaho have the same price, although stores
in eastern and western Washington have different prices. The unique pricing
regions for different products within a chain are often, but not always, the same.
The prices in Figure 2.2 are only for one product, and there is some variation
in the pricing patterns across products. For example, prices for 1/2” x 4’ x 12’
drywall board exhibit three prices in the state of Washington instead of two, but
the two pricing zones in western Washington combine to correspond exactly into
the pricing region for 5/8” x 4’ x 8’ drywall. For comparison, Figure 2.3 in the
Appendix plots unique prices for a regular 5/8” x 4’ x 8’ gypsum board at all
national Lowe’s locations.
74
Figure 2.1: Map of US Lowe’s and Home Depot stores. Each point indicates a
store location, the color of the point corresponds to a pricing intensity for 4’ x 8’
x 5./8” drywall.
Home Depot Drywall PricesGold Bond 5/8in x 4ft x 8ft Fire-Shield Gypsum Board Tapered Edge (Model GB99500800), collected 1/8/2013
Price per sheet ($)
5.98 - 6.98
6.99 - 7.60
7.61 - 7.98
7.99 - 8.50
8.51 - 8.82
8.83 - 9.25
9.26 - 9.60
9.61 - 9.86
9.87 - 10.18
10.19 - 10.74
10.75 - 11.63
11.64 - 20.35
Lowe's Drywall PricesGold Bond 5/8in x 4ft x 8ft Fire-Shield Gypsum Board Tapered Edge (Model GB99500800), collected 1/14/2013
Price per sheet ($)
5.98 - 6.73
6.74 - 7.59
7.60 - 8.42
8.43 - 9.12
9.13 - 9.43
9.44 - 9.86
9.87 - 10.30
10.31 - 10.68
10.69 - 11.17
11.18 - 11.87
11.88 - 13.28
13.29 - 18.64
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We take into account all products within a category when assigning zones.
By definition, these pricing zones are no larger than the uniform price region for
any product. Using our definition of a zone, we determine Home Depot has 165
drywall pricing zones for its 1,979 stores and Lowe’s has 129 drywall pricing zones
for its 1,714 stores in the US.1
Many pricing zones contain only one metropolitan area. Such zone might be
justified for marketing reasons or because costs and competition are similar within
a city. This would lead to profit-maximizing prices being the same across stores.
The drywall pricing zones with the most stores for both Lowe’s and Home Depot
are in Southern California, both extending from Los Angeles to San Luis Obispo.
Lowe’s has 32 pricing zones that span more than 200 miles; Home Depot has
16 such zones. Pricing zones of such size represent multiple consumer markets.
Drywall is bulky, making it unlikely that consumers would substitute to stores a
great distance away.
A notable feature about the decision to use zone pricing in retail drywall is that
costs and market structure vary considerably within a zone. Table 2.1 presents an
example from a large drywall pricing zone based around Salt Lake City, Utah. The
Home Depot stores in Logan, Utah; Rock Springs, Wyoming; and Elko, Nevada
are all in this pricing zone, and hence, the prices for drywall within these stores are
the same – the 5/8” x 4’ x 8’ drywall board is $10.98. The Home Depot in Logan
faces competition from Lowe’s, located a mile away. The nearest Lowe’s to the
stores in Rock Springs and Elko are 107 and 168 miles away, respectively. Further,
at around 50 pounds per sheet of drywall, distance should play an important role
in costs. The distance to the nearest distribution center and the distance to the
nearest factory both vary by hundreds of miles. Profit maximizing prices for each
of these stores should differ substantially, yet Home Depot places all three stores
1Three pricing zones had the prices for regular 5/8” x 4’ x 8’ sheets that were seen in other
zones, hence the 126 distinct prices for that product.
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in the same zone and assigns identical prices.
Figure 2.2: Map of unique prices for Home Depot 4’ x 8’ x 5/8” drywall.
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Figure 2.3: Zone pricing map for Lowe’s 4’ x 8’ x 5./8” drywall in the Western
United States. Each color denotes a unique price.
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The drywall pricing zones for Lowe’s and Home Depot in the United States
often have the same boundaries. In 84.9% of ZIP codes with both Lowe’s and
Home Depot stores, prices for this product match exactly. The success of the
law of one price is consistent with theories ranging from Bertrand competition
to full collusion, but it is not consistent with Bertrand competition if products
are strongly differentiated and costs differ between competing stores. However,
drywall is not a highly differentiated product – and in estimating the model, we
find that drywall products are highly substitutable within markets.
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Table 2.1: Example documenting differences in costs and competition within a
zone.
Home Depot Stores
Logan, UT Rock Springs, WY Elko, NV
Drywall Prices
regular 8’x4’x5/8” $10.98 $10.98 $10.98
mold resistant 8’x4’x1/2” $11.47 $11.47 $11.47
Distances - nearest, miles
Lowe’s 1 107 168
American Gypsum factory 743 821 491
HD Distribution Center 58 177 251
To estimate an empirical model of zone pricing with competition, we create
an original data set of prices, sales quantities, and product characteristics for all
drywall products available at 75 Home Depot stores and 53 Lowe’s stores in the
Intermountain West. We select this region of the United States as it allows us to
capture considerable variation in competition and costs, while keeping the data
collection manageable. While pricing strategies do vary across product categories,
drywall is the focus of this study for several reasons. Consumer markets are small
and relatively well-defined, because buyers are unlikely to transport something as
bulky and fragile as drywall far. Because of transportation difficulties, costs will
vary predictably across stores. Drywall is rarely used in price promotions or as a
loss leader, so category profit maximization is reasonable. Finally, drywall pricing
zones are large enough to be economically interesting, but small enough that
dozens of zones can be studied with a limited number of stores. We comment on
the differences between drywall and other product categories in the next section.
Figure 2.4 maps the stores for which we have obtained quantity data. Our
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data set includes all stores in Idaho, Montana, New Mexico, Utah, western Col-
orado, eastern Washington, and stores in adjacent states needed to complete pric-
ing zones. This region includes locations where only Home Depot operates (for
example, Elko, Nevada) and locations where only Lowe’s operates (for example,
Vernal, Utah). Menards, the third largest home improvement warehouse, operates
no stores in this region and so is omitted from the analysis.
Figure 2.4: Home Depot and Lowe’s locations where detailed pricing and sales
information was obtained
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Our sample includes 14 complete Home Depot pricing zones and 11 complete
Lowe’s pricing zones. The area considered contains several single store pricing
zones as well as one of the largest pricing zones in the nation. The zone boundaries
largely match between chains. As in the national sample, the chains often charge
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the same price in locations where they compete.
We download prices and inventory levels for individual store stock keeping
units (skus) and match these to products. For several products, Lowe’s lists several
brands on their website as different products, but those skus have identical prices
and inventory levels that (with a one day lag) coincide perfectly. We eliminate
these duplicates. Using manufacturer model numbers, we match products offered
by both chains. In all, we identify 31 distinct products. We record the thickness,
width, length, mold resistance, and moisture resistance for each product. We do
not use brand identifiers because our site visits found brands frequently mislabeled
at both chains.
Net changes in daily inventory levels for each product at each store are used
to calculate sales quantities. Decreases in inventory levels give sales quantities.
Inventory level increases of more than 20 sheets are classified as deliveries. When
deliveries occur, we take the net change in inventory for the day as the volume
of the shipment, meaning we assume no sales take place on delivery days. This
systematically under-reports sales, but deliveries occur only every 16 days on
average.2 Smaller net increases in inventory levels are counted as returns, or
negative sales.
Table 2.2 provides summary statistics for the data sample, which was collected
between 12 February 2013 and 29 July 2013. The sample includes N = 155, 184
observations. On average, daily inventory decreases by 6.2 and 7.0 sheets per
product-store for Lowe’s and Home Depot, respectively. Because the sales volume
is low, we aggregate to the fortnight level in model estimation. The observed sales
quantity would represent a small fraction of drywall used in new construction. We
interpret Lowe’s and Home Depot to be supplying the market for smaller consumer
projects, such as wall repair or room remodeling. Construction contractors and
2We provide evidence in the estimation section that suggests our results are not sensitive to
the possible measurement error in sales.
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their supply networks are participating in a separate market. Consumers in our
model will always have an outside option which will include buying from contractor
suppliers.
Table 2.2: Summary statistics for the sample
Means Lowe’s Home Depot
Sales (per product, per day)
6.19 6.97
(24.67) (19.77)
Delivery size (per product)
200.90 194.11
(294.76) (216.05)
# Products (per store)
8.60 8.97
(1.13) (1.15)
Revenue (per store, per day)
$531.87 $651.15
(381.42) (305.15)
Price (per product)
$10.90 $12.04
(3.04) (3.78)
Observations 58,100 85,787
On delivery days, typically around a hundred sheets are delivered per product-
store. The two chains have similar drywall product selection, offering around eight
products per store. The price of drywall within a market ranges from just over
$5 to over $20 per sheet, depending on the dimensions and features. The total
drywall sales revenue for the 128 stores we study sums to $25.4 million per year.
Both Home Depot and Lowe’s operate flatbed distribution centers. These
distribution centers provide store locations with lumber and board products.3
3A Lowe’s public document states: “FLATBED DISTRIBUTION CENTERS (FDC) - The
purpose is to serve Lowe’s stores with lumber, plywood, boards, and other building materials
that can be forklift loaded onto flatbed trailers.”
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Figure 2.5: Histogram of distance for each store-product to the closest firm
distribution center.
Using distribution center locations, we calculate the closest distribution center to
each store, which we utilize in cost estimation. Figure 2.5 displays a histogram of
the distances calculated. We find the average distance to stores from distribution
centers is 318 miles, with a standard deviation of 190. At the extremes, the
closest store to a distribution center is three miles, whereas the greatest distance
is just over 690 miles. Distribution centers are usually near large markets and
often Lowe’s and Home Depot distribution centers are near each other. In our
sample region, one big difference is Home Depot’s placement of a distribution
center in northern Utah, whereas Lowe’s nearest distribution center is in southern
Nevada. Since a sheet of drywall exceeds fifty pounds, we expect distance to be an
important driver of costs. Labor costs may also be important. To measure them,
we use ZIP code level wages for home improvement retailers from the Quarterly
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Census of Employment and Wages.
2.2.2 Pricing Patterns in Retail Home Improvement
Home improvement warehouses chains use zone pricing in many, but not all of their
product categories. The pricing zones for different products vary considerably in
their size and coherence. Drywall, like other heavy products, has many small
pricing zones. Other product categories have large regional pricing zones.
To explore the heterogeneity in zones across products, we collect national cross
sections of prices in nine product categories: Drywall, Hardwood Plywood, Roof
Underlayment, Stone Pavers, Window Film, Insulation Panels, Mosiac Glass Tiles,
Phillips Screwdrivers, and LED Light Bulbs. Some of these categories are heavy
and costly to transport (such as Stone Pavers and Drywall), while others are light
or have a high value/weight ratio (such as LED Light Bulbs or Mosiac Glass Tiles).
The products also vary in whether demand is seasonal or steady, whether demand
is regional or national, and whether they are transported on flatbed trucks or in
containers.
We collect prices for these categories for all store locations at Home Depot,
Lowe’s, and Menards, as each site offers store specific product selection and price
quotes. In total, over 600,000 prices are recorded. Prices for most categories were
collected in March 2014. The drywall and plywood prices are exceptions and
are from April 2013. In our spot checks, the listed price on the website exactly
matched the posted price inside the store.
Table 2.3 contains descriptive statistics for each category and chain. The table
shows there is considerable variation in the number of products offered across
stores and in the number of prices per product nationally. For example, Home
Depot offers 45 unique products in the plywood category, and each store carries
roughly 24 plywood products. On average, each product has 5.44 different prices
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nationally. The distribution is skewed; the median number of prices per product
is one, suggesting that plywood at Home Depot is largely uniformly priced. These
facts do not hold for plywood sold at Lowe’s, where the median number of prices
if 21. On the other hand, mosaic glass tile is a category where most products
have a single, uniform price at all the stores within any of the three chains. House
brand paint is an example of a product category that has no variation in price
nationally for both Lowe’s and Home Depot.
We define a pricing zone for a product category as before: a set of stores with
exactly the same price on all products offered in the category (see Figure 2.6 for
a clear example of zone pricing for a specific product offered at Menards). The
pricing areas for individual products within a category usually align (such as dry-
wall). There are occasional exceptions where the pricing areas for products within
a category do not align (Window films at Lowe’s is the most notable exception).
This would occur, for example, if a product has two prices along a North-South
line and for a second product to have two prices along an East-West line.
Since products within a category may have pricing areas that do not align
perfectly, we employ an algorithm to classify the zone structures across chains
and categories. Some ambiguity is created by differences in product availability.
Consider, for example, three stores with common prices for most of their products.
If one product is offered at a high price in the first store, offered at a low price
in the second store, and not carried at all by the third store, then the third store
could be in the pricing zone of either the first or second store. Our algorithm to
classify zones starts with the westernmost store in a chain, which is declared to
be in the first zone. If prices at the second westernmost store match for all the
products at the first store, then this store is also in the first zone. If not, it is
designated as belonging to a new pricing zone. This is repeated store by store
from east to west. Other ways of sorting the stores yield slightly different zones
and zone counts. We find pricing zones for the product categories at all three
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Table 2.3: Data collected for descriptive evidence
Category Statistic HD Lowe’s Menards
Plywood
N 47,462 77,417 5,559
Unique Prods. 45 148 22
Prods. per store 23.98 45.20 19.57
Prices per prod. 5.44 / 1 23.65 / 21 5.19 / 4
Roof Underlayment
N 11,120 10,510 2,418
Unique Prods. 28 25 11
Prods. per store 5.65 8.34 8.45
Prices per prod. 33.82 / 32 52.14 / 38 10.15 / 3
Stone Pavers
N 31,132 28,334 6,011
Unique Prods. 130 303 37
Prods. per store 15.84 22.49 21.02
Prices per prod. 8.65 / 2 12.43 / 2 6.00 / 2
Window Film
N 19,680 40,320 4,839
Unique Prods. 10 42 19
Prods. per store 10.00 32.00 16.92
Prices per prod. 2.1 / 1.5 4.53 / 2 3.42 / 3
Insulation Panels
N 29,868 14,242 5,093
Unique Prods. 64 68 31
Prods. per store 15.17 11.30 17.81
Prices per prod. 14.48 / 7 22.50 / 22 16.53 / 19
Mosaic Glass Tile
N 30,710 40,272 12,716
Unique Prods. 53 95 124
Prods. per store 15.59 31.96 44.46
Prices per prod. 2.08 / 1 1.66 / 1 2.07 / 2
Phillips Screwdrivers
N 29,613 40,232 30,939
Unique Prods. 18 37 113
Prods. per store 15.03 32 108.18
Prices per prod. 4.93 / 5 1.31 / 1 1.01 / 1
LED Light Bulbs
N 47,280 40,320 26,976
Unique Prods. 40 35 135
Prods. per store 24.00 32.00 94.32
Prices per prod. 6.23 / 4 3.02 / 3 1.62 / 2
Notes: N denotes the number of product-store observations obtained. Unique Prods. is
the number of unique products across all stores using both internal SKU and brand ID
numbers. Prods. per store is the average store assortment size. Prices per prod. reports
the mean and median number of prices across products, frequency weighted by the number
of stores carrying each product.
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Figure 2.6: Example of zone pricing at Menards.
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Menards Handy Sand PricesConcrete Mix, 50 Pounds (Model 1891344), collected 1/9/2013
Price per bag
k $3.73
# $3.90
GF $4.22
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XY $4.40
_^ $4.50
& $4.75
" $4.88
!( $5.49
chains.
The pricing zones are not the same for different product categories. Figure 2.7
maps the pricing areas for a particular LED light bulb and sheet of drywall at
Home Depot in the western United States. While drywall (right) has well-defined
pricing regions that span hundreds of miles, the prices for the LED light bulb are
more concentrated around a single price, with lower prices available in Southern
California and select stores in Washington and Oregon. This variation in pricing
strategy across categories is reflected in the difference in zone size and in the
number of zones for categories.
Table 2.4 reports the number of zones classified using the algorithm described
above. There is considerable variation in the number of zones across categories
as well as the number of zones across firms within a category. Drywall, plywood,
and roofing underfilm have the most pricing zones. On the other hand, there are
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Figure 2.7: Comparison in zone structure for drywall and LED light bulbs.
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only a few national mosaic tile zones at all three retailers. While both Lowe’s and
Home Depot use zone pricing for power sanders, Menards has adopted a uniform
pricing policy. Products with low weight-to-value ratios tend to have finer pricing
zones, reflecting the importance of transportation costs.
For drywall, the pricing zones for Home Depot and Lowe’s are quite similar
in size and in their boundaries. This is not generally the case. In insulation and
windows films, for example, Lowe’s has much finer pricing zones.
Table 2.5 shows the number of stores in the largest price zone. Some product
categories have expansive zones with a substantial fraction of a chain’s stores
sharing a common price on all products. In heavy, bulky products, shipping costs
vary too much over such broad areas for the same set of prices to be maintained
nationally.
The smaller zones are not simply subsets of the zones for other products. Zone
boundaries for different product categories intersect, with a zone in one category
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Table 2.4: Number of pricing zones, by product category
Number of zones
Category Home Depot Lowe’s Menards
Drywall 165 129 50
Hardwood Plywood 69 247 47
Store-brand interior paint 14 1 1
Insulation 9 170 91
Mosaic 9 4
Power Sanders 24 22 1
Roofing 51 213 75
Window Films 9 108 28
Table 2.5: Number of stores in largest pricing zone, by product category
Number of stores
Category Home Depot Lowe’s Menards
Drywall 80 94
Hardwood Plywood 232 43
Store-brand interior paint 743 1714
Insulation 1759 170 21
Window Films 805 616 38
Roofing 498 32 24
Power Sanders 569 548
overlapping multiple zones in another category and vis versa. Figure 2.7 com-
pares pricing regions for a single pair of products in the LED light bulbs (on the
left) and drywall (duplicating Figure 2.2 on the right) categories. The drywall
product has different prices in the San Francisco Bay Area, California’s Central
Valley, and Utah’s Wasatch Front, but all three regions pay the same price for the
light bulb. All of Western Oregon is part of one drywall pricing zone, but three
different prices of light bulb are found in the area. Pricing zones for whole pric-
ing categories exhibit the same complexity as the individual products of Figure 2.7.
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2.3 Model
In this section we introduce the structural model of supply under zone pricing
and demand. Competing firms operate stores in multiple markets, and each store
sells multiple products. Consumers choose between all the products at stores
in their market according to a standard discrete choice setup. Firms set prices
in two-stages. First, they partition their stores into pricing zones. Next, they
simultaneously chose the price levels of each zone to maximize profits subject
to the zones they have chosen. To start, we introduce some notation and our
definition of a pricing zone. Next, we describe the consumer’s problem. Finally, we
detail the pricing game the firms play and show how spatial menu costs determine
the selection of pricing zones.
2.3.1 Products, Stores, Markets, and Zones
Each firm operates a networks of stores. Stores, indexed by s, each have a location
`. Firms may operate more than one store at `. Let Sf` be the set of stores operated
by firm f at location `, and let S` :=
⋃
f S
f
` be the set of all stores in location `.
Each firm partitions its stores into pricing zones. Let these partitions be
denoted by Zf . An element in the partition is comprised of all the stores in the
same pricing zone. Conceptually, if firm f (superscript suppressed) operates four
stores across two zones, with a single store in the first zone,
Z := {z1, z2}
:=
{
{s1}︸︷︷︸
z1
, {s2, s3, s4}︸ ︷︷ ︸
z2
}
.
If s1 is in location 1, s2 is in location 2, and s3 and s4 are both in location 3.
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The same partition could also be described by
Z =
{
{S1}︸︷︷︸
z1
, {S2, S3}︸ ︷︷ ︸
z2
}
.
Zone pricing implies that for every product j in every period t
pjst = pjs′t, ∀s, s′ ∈ z
With the example above, the firm uses store level pricing for z1. However, for
all j ∈ ⋂i∈2,3,4 Jsi , the price is constant for j across z2. Because the product set
is allowed to be different across stores, the definition of a zone implies that if a
product is offered at at least two stores within a zone, the price is the same across
the stores.
Compared to the observed zone structure, alternative pricing regimes are asso-
ciated with a spatial menu cost µZ
f ;Z−f that the firm must pay. These menu costs
encompass all costs related to changing the zone structure – including reevaluating
profits.
In total, there are J differentiated drywall products, where each store offers
a subset of these products each period. Let Js,t be the set of products offered at
store s in period t. The product set may change over time due to inventory or the
discontinuation or introduction of a product. The discontinuation, introduction,
and overall selection of products is not modeled; however, the product set is mostly
constant within a zone so there is little evidence of strategic product placement.
Given products, product characteristics, and prices, consumers at each location
solve for demands.
A market is a location in time period, (`, t). It has a market size of M`,t.
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2.3.2 Demand
Consumers solve a nested-logit discrete choice utility maximization problem. Con-
sider a consumer living at location `. The choice set facing this consumer is the
set of products sold by all stores at `, that is
⋃
s∈S` Js,t or an outside option.
The decision to not purchase a good yields a normalized utility, Ui0t = i0t. By
purchasing product j, consumer i receives indirect utility
Uijt = xjβ − αpjt + ξjt + ζigt(σ) + (1− σ)ijt, (2.1)
where β measures preferences over a vector of product characteristics xj, pjt is
price, α is the marginal utility to income, and ξjt is unobserved (to the econome-
trician) product quality. The composite taste shock, ζig(σ) + (1 − σ)ij, follows
a Type-1 Extreme Value distribution among group g – the nesting variable. The
outside good is in its own nest. Note when σ = 0, the composite error term
simplifies to just ij, which yields the standard logit demand system. As σ → 1,
products within nests are increasingly close substitutes, and in the limit, when
σ = 1, there is no substitution outside of the nest. Each period consumers pur-
chase the good that maximizes their individual indirect utility Uijt or select the
outside good if Ui0t > Uijt for all j ∈
⋃
s∈S` Js,t.
As shown in Berry (1994), given the logit structure of demand, the log differ-
ence in market share of good j compared with outside good j = 0 equals
ln(ςjt)− ln(ς0t) = xjβ − αpjt + σ ln(ςjt/g) + ξjt.
Here, ςj/g is the market share of product j within group g.
4 The demand param-
eters to be estimated are θD = (β, α, σ). We address the endogeneity of prices in
Section 2.4.1.
4We use ςj to denote the purchase probability (market share) instead of the typically seen sj
because we use s to denote a store.
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2.3.3 Supply
Prices are set in two stages. First, firms simultaneously partition their stores
into zones, selecting Zf and paying spatial menu cost µZf . After zone partitions
are publicly known, firms select zone prices for each product to maximize total
firm profits. The second stage price decisions differ from standard multiproduct
Bertrand competition only in that firms are constrained for a given product to set
identical prices within a zone.
The first stage is a simultaneous move game in which every possible zone
partition is a possible action. Payoffs in the first stage depend on the spatial
menu costs for the zone partition selected and the pre-menu cost profits that
emerge from Bertrand competition in the second stage.
Let cjs be the constant marginal cost associated with offering j at store s.
Given a zone structure chosen in the first stage, the profits accrued to a firm for
selling product j in period t are
pifj :=
∑
z∈Z
∑
s∈z
(pjz − cjs)qjs, (2.2)
where qjs := M`ςjs and M` is the market size corresponding to the location of
store s. Implicitly, only zones and stores that offer j are included in the sum,
and ςj := ςj(X,p, ξ;Z,θ
D). Lastly, we assume there are no further fixed costs
associated with offering products.
Firms maximize total profits. Total profits are the summation of profits over
the products offered by the firm minus the spatial menu costs. Once zones are
set, the second stage profit maximization problem involves selecting a price for
every zone-product:
max
pf
∑
z∈Zf
∑
s∈z
∑
j∈Js
(pjz − cjs) qjs − µ(Zf ;Z−f ). (2.3)
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Each market share ςjst is a function of the prices in market (`, t), including all
competitor prices.
The model is quite general and encompasses several cases which are commonly
seen in retailing. In the special case of uniform pricing, there is only one zone for
the firm and it contains the entire network. Since, Z ≡ z := {S}, the profit max-
imization takes simpler form. The first sum in Equation 2.3 disappears entirely
so
max
pf
∑
s∈S
∑
j∈Js
(
pjZ − cjs
)
qjs − µuniform.
Another possibility is that firms operate store-level pricing, or market-level pricing
Finally, in the second stage, firms take price zones as given and set prices to
maximize profits.
An equilibrium for the game depends on zones and prices chosen amongst the
players. Formally, an equilibrium is a set of pricing zones Z∗, prices p∗ ∈ R|Z∗|+ ,
and market shares ς∗ ∈ R|JS | such that
1. Given pricing zones (Z∗) and competitor prices (p∗−f ), p∗f solves Equa-
tion 2.3
2. Given competitor pricing zones Z∗−f , Z∗f is chosen such that
pi∗f
(
Z∗f ;Z∗−f
)
≥ pi∗f
(
Z ′f ;Z∗−f
)
∀ Z ′f
3. Given prices p∗, ς∗ follows from consumers solving Equation 2.1
We assume firms play a game of perfect information in pure strategies.
Unfortunately, the equilibria defined for a given zone structure Z are not in
general unique. We found dozens of distinct equilibria for each system of zone
partitions we examined. Caplin and Nalebuff (1991) proves uniqueness for com-
petition within multinomial logit demand systems for single product firms, but its
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result does not generalize to the multiproduct firms we see in our data. In particu-
lar, there are equilibria in which firms assign high prices to some products to take
advantage of the tail consumers with particularly high ij draws while shepherding
the rest of the consumers into moderately priced products. Different equilibria as-
sign the role of the moderately priced mainstream alternative to different products
and vary as to which store engage in this version of price discrimination.
In order to evaluate the menu costs associated with alternative pricing policies
we must ensure that differences we find are due to the policies themselves, and
not due to switching between vastly different equilibria. We therefore investigate
small deviations from the observed equilibrium, allowing firms to switch to market
level pricing one product at a time. By only allowing for adjustments in prices of
a specific good in a single market, the result of Caplin and Nalebuff (1991) does
guarantee unique equilibria. Hence, in our definition of a Bertrand-Nash Equilib-
rium, we condition on the zone structure instead of having firms choose zones. We
also explore a move to alternative pricing regimes for all products simultaneously.
We discuss a metagame of zone choice and pricing, and calculate menu costs after
implementing a selection mechanism on equilibrium. All experiments are reported
in Section 5.
2.4 Estimation and Results
We proceed by estimating the demand parameters which enter shares ς as well
as marginal costs. We run our estimates in two stages. First, we estimate the
demand parameters of the nested logit model. Given estimates of the demand pa-
rameters, we solve for marginal costs assuming firms are competing in a Bertrand
game of zone pricing. As zone pricing is a consequence of solving a constrained
optimization problem, we cannot invert the first-order conditions to back out
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marginal costs. Instead, we parametrize the cost function, and simultaneously re-
cover marginal costs and cost parameters using mathematical programming with
equilibrium constraints (MPEC). With our estimates, we calculate observed prof-
its of the current zone structure. Given the presence of multiple equilibria, we use
observed prices to calculate current zone profits.5
2.4.1 Demand
We invert market shares, as shown in Berry (1994), to obtain ln(ςj) − ln(ς0) =
δj, where δj is the mean utility from purchasing product j. To account for the
endogeneity of unobserved product quality being correlated with price, we pursue
both instrumental variable and fixed effects approaches. We separate unobserved
product quality as
ξjt := ξj + ξt + ∆ξjt,
where we assume ∆ξjt is uncorrelated with price and observed product charac-
teristics. For product characteristics, we use the dimensions of the gypsum board
(length, width, height), and whether the drywall is mold resistant and/or mois-
ture resistant. We estimate ξt as a market-time fixed effect. We compare this
method with an instrument variables approach, where we instrument price by us-
ing a Hausman instrument – average prices for a given product in other markets
where the product is offered.
We use a product-store hierarchy for nests within markets. The top level
of nests denotes the various product types available in the market (`, t). We
define product types as the grouping of product dimensions. The second nest
comprises the various stores in the market that sell that particular product type.
The interpretation of σ in this nesting structure is the degree of substitutability
5By solving for equilibrium zone prices given observed prices as starting values, we obtain
equilibria prices quite close to observed prices. The geometric fit between the two is 93%. This
is discussed further in Section 5.
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of a product type across the various stores at location ` at time t. We specify
the nesting structure this way because of conversations we have had with home
builders, who say that by far, the most important characteristic of drywall is the
size, particularly the thickness. Specifically, almost all walls use 1/2-inch boards,
but 5/8-inch is necessary on fire walls, such as the walls separating the interior
from a garage. If size is the most important characteristic, we would expect that
consumers substitute to other stores in the market for a particular drywall type
instead of substituting to a different size sheet at the same store. Hence, our nests
are at the product type level instead of the store level. We expect to (and do)
estimate σ close to one, which suggests that a particular product type is highly
substitutable across stores within a market.
Identification for parameters in this stage results from the observed purchases
of consumers given their choice set, following the standard revealed preference
identification for discrete choice demand systems. In every market, all products
and their associated prices and characteristics are known. Product indicators and
characteristics are constant across all markets. The other products offered vary
by market and relative prices vary by zone. The response of sales quantities to
these different relative prices and product offerings identifies the price coefficient
α. Preferences for observed and unobserved product characteristics are revealed
through market shares.
We estimate several demand specifications. First, we set σ = 0 in the nested
logit model so that the nests do not matter. This results in the classic logit de-
mand system. We estimate this specification assuming prices are exogenous (using
Ordinary Least Squares) and then use a fixed-effects approach to address the en-
dogeneity of prices. We then estimate σ along with the demand parameters, again
assuming prices are exogenous, and then accounting for endogeneity. Given the
nesting structure, all observed product characteristics within a nest are identical,
except price which may vary across the stores in the market. Hence, for the nested
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logit model using instrumental variables, we use store fixed effects to address the
endogeneity problem on the group shares. For the nested logit model using fixed
effects, the endogeneity problem on group shares is already addressed by having
the fixed effects be product-store (“j”) specific.
We aggregate daily sales so that t denotes a two week period because many
drywall products have few daily sales. Observations with zero sales must be
dropped, because ln(ςjt) would be undefined
6 At the biweekly level, 5.70% of
products exhibit zero sales. Aggregating data across time does not introduce
as much measurement error as it might in other applications, because product
characteristics are all time-invariant and prices rarely change. Over 127 days of
data collection, only 9.4% of product-store combinations exhibit price changes.
Of the products to see price adjustments, 88% (77 products) of them experience
a single change and 12% (11 products) see two price adjustments.
In order to complete the demand system, we need to specify market size. We
define a market to be a Core Based Statistical Area (CBSA) over a two week
period. For stores not located within CBSAs, we set the market to be the county
in which the store resides. With this interpretation of markets, each location `
typically has several stores from both Home Depot and Lowe’s. Further, given the
structure of pricing regions by both firms, regions overlap into several markets.
We take market size to be proportional to the 2010 CSBA population.7
The results of the demand estimation appear in Table 2.6. Across all specifica-
tions, all coefficients have expected signs and are significant across specifications.
We estimate that consumers prefer larger drywall sheets and mold resistant pan-
els. The unreported coefficients on drywall thickness are reasonable and show
that industry standard 1/2-inch panels are much more desirable than all other
6See Gandhi, Lu, and Shi (2013) for estimating discrete choice demand systems with products
that exhibit zero sales.
7For observations not within CBSAs, we take the population to be proportional to the 2010
Census county population.
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Table 2.6: Demand estimation results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Logit Nested logit IV nested logit FE nested logit
Price -0.594∗∗∗ -0.650∗∗∗ -0.831∗∗∗ -0.359∗∗∗
(0.0172) (0.0108) (0.0129) (0.0141)
Area 0.130∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗ 0.194∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗
(0.00404) (0.00269) (0.00308) (0.00639)
Mold resist. 1.167∗∗∗ 1.385∗∗∗ 1.838∗∗∗ 1.555∗∗∗
(0.0667) (0.0441) (0.0457) (0.260)
Chain 0.938∗∗∗ 0.295∗∗∗ 1.719∗∗∗ 0.292∗
(0.0334) (0.0231) (0.176) (0.116)
σ 0.918∗∗∗ 0.601∗∗∗ 0.831∗∗∗
(0.00821) (0.0119) (0.00887)
Thickness FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Store FE No No Yes Yes
Product FE No No No Yes
elasmean -6.620 -55.99 -17.58 -15.79
elasmin -12.92 -136.7 -35.87 -36.57
elasmax -2.665 -2.894 -2.869 -1.609
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
thicknesses. We estimate that consumers are price sensitive, with the marginal
utility of income −0.375 in the fixed effects, nested-logit model (Model 4). Our
estimates on price sensitivity do not become more negative when accounting for
the potential endogeneity between prices and unobserved drywall quality, which
is not what we would expect as high priced items are typically assumed to be
positively correlated with unobserved quality. This is true for both the fixed
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effects and instrumental variables approach. Our interpretation on the price coef-
ficient across specifications is that given any two drywall products with identical
(observed) characteristics but different prices, consumers would gravitate towards
the cheaper good as the other (unobserved) characteristics are not worth the addi-
tional expense. Hence, in our setting, the correlation between unobserved quality
and price is negative leading to price sensitivities closer to zero after accounting
for endogeneity. We estimate the mean own-price elasticities to be -16 and -18
for the fixed effects and instrumental variables nested logit models, respectively.
These values are large in magnitude but not unreasonable given the high substi-
tutability of drywall products, especially within nests. For the final specification
(4), we obtain industry elasticities of −0.03 to −0.04 depending on the market.
Finally, we estimate the coefficient reflecting substitutability within nests to be
high, at 0.830 in the last specification. This suggests that consumers would rather
drive to another store within the market to buy a particular drywall panel than
substitute to a different size.8
In the following analysis, we use Model (4) – the nested logit model with fixed
effects – as our model of consumer demand. Our results are not sensitive to this
choice as the nested logit model with instrumental variables yields quantitatively
similar answers. Aggregating the data to just the week level also yields similar
results.
2.4.2 Recovering Marginal Costs
Marginal costs can typically be recovered using the demand estimates and the first
order conditions of each profit maximizing firm. In the single good, market level
pricing case, Lerner’s index is inversely proportional to the own-price elasticity.
With observed prices and an estimated demand elasticity, the marginal cost is
8Our model of demand assumes it is costless for consumers to travel to stores within a market.
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identified. A multi-product analog, as seen in Nevo (2001) and Petrin (2002), can
be used when firms set prices for all products at the market level. Since firms here
set a uniform zone price, the first order condition based on Equation 2.4 differs
from the condition on which the standard approach is based. Each price pjz is
obtained from solving
∂pi
∂pjz
=
∑
s∈z
∑
i∈Js
(piz − cis)M` ∂ςis
∂pjz
+
∑
s∈z
M`ςjs = 0. (2.4)
The first-order condition for each price contains marginal costs for all stores within
its pricing zone. The supply system yields |J × Z| first-order conditions of the
form in Equation 2.4. However, there are |J × S| marginal costs to identify and
|S| > |Z|. As there are more marginal costs than first-order conditions, no set of
first-order conditions can be directly solved to recover marginal costs.
To make progress in recovering marginal costs, we first parametrize costs as
cjst = aj + κds + νjzt,
where aj is a fixed effect for product j, and ds is the distance from store s to
the closest flatbed distribution center. The cost shock νjzt is an unobserved (to
the econometrician) and enters at the product, zone, time level. Let θS = (aj, κ).
Because the cost shock is at the product level, we cannot manipulate Equation 2.4
to recover costs directly; however, given an objective function on ν, we can simul-
taneously recover marginal costs and the parameters governing costs. Instead of
using a nested fixed-point approach, we proceed with using mathematical pro-
gramming with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) as seen in Su and Judd (2012).
Forming moment conditions on ν directly, along with the optimality conditions
from the firms’ zone pricing problems, completes the mathematical program.
Firms want high prices at stores with high costs and at stores with monopoly
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power. An unconstrained optimum price for a competitive, low-cost store would
be lower. When a firm has both types of stores in the same price zone, the
optimal price balances these considerations using Equation 2.4. Only the zone
price, market power (through estimated price elasticities), market size, and a few
cost variables are observed, but the zone price reveals information on the marginal
costs for its stores. Identification effectively comes from how weighted averages
of store cost variables are correlated with the zone price. For example, if zones
full of competitive stores far removed from a distribution center have a high zone
price, then distribution center distance is an important driver of costs.
Our simplification in making the unobserved error term ν be product, zone,
time specific instead of product, store, time specific results in the dimension of
the error term being equal to the number of equilibrium conditions. Without this
assumption on the cost shock, we would have an unidentified system. Although
restrictive, we do account for transportation costs and wages at the store level.
The objective comes from moment conditions on ν. Let W := [aj,d] be the
matrix of covariates on costs. The method of moments estimator is derived from
E[W′ν] = 0, leading to the sample analogue
gj(W,θ
S) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
wjiνi = 0.
Letting FOC(θS,ν) denote the set of equilibrium conditions characterized by the
first-order conditions of the firms’ problems, the MPEC program is to solve
min
θS ,ν
g(W,θS)′g(W,θS)
s.t. FOC(θS,ν) = 0.
In estimating costs, we obtain a negative, but insignificant coefficient on wage.
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We drop wage from the model and proceed with estimating product fixed effects
and the coefficient on distance. The remaining coefficients are very similar to
the model with wages included. Cost estimations are reported in Table 2.7. We
estimate the parameter on distance (per mile) to be $0.00052. On average, trans-
portation from the distribution center contributes $0.20 to the cost of a drywall
sheet. We find transportation costs for different stores range from $0.002 to $0.46.
The coefficient on distance is lower than other estimates of transportation costs
in similar settings. Miller and Osborune (2011) estimate a transportation cost
$0.30/ton mile for Portland cement. The equivalent cost for a fifty pound sheet
of drywall would be $0.0075/mile, which is over eleven times larger than we find.
If, however, other products shipped to stores on flatbed trucks need frequent de-
liveries, perhaps much of the drywall inventory is shipped on trucks with spare
capacity. Indeed, we find that the deliveries for drywall are less than the full
capacity of a flatbed trailer.
2.4.3 Observed Pricing Regime
With observed prices and the marginal costs we estimate, we calculate the sales
weighted average markup on a sheet of drywall to be $1.11. With an average
price of a sheet of drywall at $10.22, we find the margin on drywall to be around
11.0%. We estimate profits on drywall for the stores of interest to be about $29
million annually. Table 2.8 details equilibrium zone pricing profits by chain and
competition type. Only 3 of the 53 Lowe’s stores in our region are in markets
where Home Depot is absent. Home Depot on the other hand has 20 of their
75 stores in markets without competition from Lowe’s. These twenty account for
38% of Home Depot’s revenue. Interestingly, 15 of the 20 Home Depot monopoly
stores are in pricing zones with stores that do face competition from Lowe’s. A
higher price that would extract the most profit in the monopoly markets must
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Table 2.7: Cost Estimates
Point Estimates Std Error
dist (κ) 0.00052 (0.00016)∗∗∗
Product Fixed Effects
a1 : 8.384 a11 : 11.631 a21 : 12.609
a2 : 7.561 a12 : 12.154 a22 : 11.323
a3 : 2.088 a13 : 10.670 a23 : 14.052
a4 : 7.137 a14 : 10.900 a24 : 18.613
a5 : 7.947 a15 : 12.395 a25 : 13.860
a6 : 7.948 a16 : 12.063 a26 : 9.760
a7 : 9.307 a17 : 8.921 a27 : 9.989
a8 : 14.592 a18 : 11.042 a28 : 15.298
a9 : 7.137 a19 : 11.180 a29 : 10.236
a10 : 12.990 a20 : 13.269 a30 : 14.363
a31 : 14.873
Zone clustered standard errors. All FEs significant at 1%
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
be balanced by a lower price needed to maintain market share in competitive
markets. Because several of the monopoly store are in large, lower cost zones,
average prices for monopoly markets are slightly below average prices overall. As
a consequence, the current zone structure greatly limits Home Depot’s effective
market power. Indeed, we estimate Home Depot only obtains 16.48% of its profits
from monopoly stores
Figure 2.8 plots a histogram of observed profits, by chain, aggregated by store.
The histograms show there is considerable variation in profits across stores. In
this region, Home Depot distribution centers are closer to more stores, so our
estimates generally find Home Depot stores to have lower costs and higher profits
than Lowe’s stores. We estimate a majority of the Lowe’s stores have less than
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$1 million in annual profits for drywall, with the maximum profits being nearly
$2 million annually. On the other hand, Home Depot operates a few stores that
exceed $2 million in annual profits. Both chains operate stores with nearly zero
profits from drywall sales.
2.5 Alternative Pricing Regimes
Here we calculate optimal pricing policies by changing the zone structure of firms.
Given the presence of multiple equilibria, we investigate moving one product from
its current zone pricing scheme to market level pricing. In this exercise we hold all
other product prices constant at their observed levels. This guarantees a unique
equilibrium for the exercise. We first consider holding competitor prices fixed.
In a second exercise, we allow both chains to switch to market level pricing for
a single product. Previous work on zone pricing has not taken into account this
competitor response, and we highlight that this leads to an overstatement in profit
gains by 33% in retail drywall. We discuss how profit changes in either experiment
relate to various interpretations of spatial menu costs.
Table 2.8: Current Profits by Chain and Market Type
Lowe’s Home Depot
% of pi Annual pi % of pi Annual pi
Monopoly 3.28% $273,462 16.48% $3,356,029
Duopoly 96.72% $8,057,492 83.52% $17,007,531
Annual pi $8,330,954 $20,363,560
Duopoly means there is a competitor store in the market (CSBA). Profits are annualized.
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Figure 2.8: Histogram of observed profits, by chain, and aggregated to the store
level.
2.5.1 Unilateral Single Product Deviations
We first let one chain switch to market level pricing for one product while hold-
ing fixed prices on all of its other products and prices on all of its competitor’s
products. Market by market we calculate new prices that maximize total firm
profits. For this exercise, profit gains must be nonnegative as the zone price is
in the choice set and all other prices are unchanged. In some sense, the profit
gains here represent a lower bound on menu costs. If post-menu cost profits were
higher with market level pricing given competitor prices, then the observed zone
pricing would not be a best response to those competitor prices and hence not
an equilibrium strategy. This also parallels the approach of the prior literature,
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which estimate profit gains from store level pricing implicitly keeping competitor
prices fixed by not modeling competition.
A zone price must balance the profit gains available by raising the price at
stores facing high residual demand or high marginal cost with the losses that
would follow from overcharging at stores in the zone where marginal costs are
lowest or residual demand is most elastic. The optimal market-specific prices are
spread both above and below the zone price. In our sample, when one firm can
adjust one product-market price, we find prices in 62% of product-store observa-
tions increase and decrease for 38% of product-store observations. Together the
sales weighted average price increases by $0.12. As expected, prices in monopoly
markets increase. Figure 2.9 provides a density plot of price deviations by market
competition for Home Depot stores. As expected, the average price in monopoly
markets increases $1.63. For some products in monopoly markets, prices increase
by over $3 or by nearly 25%. In contested duopoly markets, the average price
decreases by $0.08. While the average deviation in duopoly markets is negative,
Figure 2.9 shows that for some products Home Depot increases prices in duopoly
markets by over $2. Some of these price increases occur because Lowe’s usually
offers the same product but does not stock it in that particular market, giving the
Home Depot store some market power for that product.
For monopoly stores in their own pricing zone, the zone pricing problem and
this exercise coincide. However, since costs are not perfectly measured, observed
zone prices are not necessarily equal to optimal zone prices. Hence, when solving
for optimal prices for products in monopoly markets and own zones, we find
small price adjustments to solve the first-order conditions on the firm’s problem.
Therefore, we report nonzero profit gains for these products. These errors are
lumped together with the menu cost. An alternative exercise would begin with
a simulated equilibrium instead of observed prices. There are multiple pricing
equilibria for the current zone structure, and while some are very close to observed
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Figure 2.9: Density of Home Depot price changes when a chain adopts market
level pricing holding competitor prices fixed. The plot shows that in monopoly
markets, prices only increase whereas in duopoly markets, prices both increase
and decrease.
prices and quantities, we would need to dictate an equilibrium selection rule. Here
we begin with the equilibrium that has been observed and proceed with small
changes that would force the selection of a new equilibrium.
When summing the profit gains from all the single product deviations, we find
market level pricing to give profit gains of around 3.3% of revenue, or 33% of
current profits. This equates to nearly $6.7 million in additional industry profits
annually for the 128 stores of study. We calculate the average annual gain to be
$10,430 per store for Home Depot and $11,617 per store for Lowe’s.
Our findings are consistent with the previous empirical studies of zone pricing
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and with elementary price discrimination theory. Without competitive effects,
offering separate prices in each market will increase profits, while lowering prices
for some consumers and raising them for others.
2.5.2 Single Product Market Equilibria
We next allow competitors to respond with market level pricing of their own,
again in one product. For that product, we find an equilibria in which both
chains set a market-specific price that are best responses to the others price. The
equilibrium prices we find have the same general features as in the first exercise.
In duopoly markets prices decrease $0.09 from the observed zone price. The price
increase in monopoly markets are the same, since there the equilibrium price and
the unilateral deviation price are identical. In 55% of product-store observations
prices increase.
Prices that were lowered in the unilateral deviation are decreased further in
equilibrium in 74.4% of observations in duopoly markets. In the Salt Lake City
market, for example, 4’x8’x5/8” regular drywall is sold for $10.98 when firms use
zone prices. Both Lowe’s and Home Depot have monopoly stores and distant,
higher cost stores in the same price zone, and their zone prices reflects this. If
all other prices were fixed, Home Depot would set a market level price of $10.70.
Lowe’s would charge $10.74. In equilibrium, Home Depot has to compete not
against a fixed $10.98 Lowe’s prices, but against a more competitive Lowe’s price.
Likewise, Lowe’s must respond to a lower Home Depot price. Therefore, Home
Depot’s equilibrium price is reduced to $10.63.
In a few markets, one firm’s zone price falls below their optimal price, while
the other firm’s is above their optimal price. This can come from cost differences
stemming from the dissimilar placement of distribution centers or from one firm’s
zone containing more monopoly stores that push up the optimal zone price. In
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these markets, equilibrium considerations moderate the price movements seen in
the unilateral deviation experiment. In some high cost markets, a firm in the uni-
lateral deviation experiment will double its price, forfeiting the mainstream market
to capture consumers with strong product-specific preferences. If the rival chain
raises its price, its equilibrium price will be lower than the unilateral deviation,
as returning to something closer to normal competition becomes more appealing.
Under certain conditions, to ignore competition would cause overstatement of the
effect of moving to market level pricing, but in our region understatement was
more common.
Because competitive effects are absent in monopoly markets, the effects that
competition magnifies are mostly price decreases in duopoly markets. Because
industry demand is so inelastic, these price decreases reduce profits. In total,
equilibrium profit gains are 32.9% lower than in the move to market level pricing
holding competitor prices fixed. The sum over all products of moving from a zone
pricing equilibrium to a market pricing equilibrium are 2.2% of current revenue.
The profit gains are almost evenly split between Home Depot and Lowe’s in total;
per store Lowe’s gains more: $8,879 to Home Depot’s $6,665.
In the price discrimination theory literature, the profit effects of increased
ability to price discriminate depend on the industry and cross-price elasticities of
demand. Drywall industry demand is nearly inelastic and many products are close
substitutes, bringing it close to the conditions in Holmes (1989) where discrimina-
tion yields lower industry profits than uniform pricing. Yet, in our counterfactual
experiment, industry profits increase. Some of this is driven by the presence of
monopoly markets, but even in duopoly markets profits increase on net. Further-
more, in every zone industry profits increase under market level pricing, although
Lowe’s profits decrease in a few zones.
If firms can credibly commit to their pricing zones, the (pre-menu cost) profit
gains calculated here are lower bounds on the relevant menu costs. If the menu
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costs for market level pricing are more than a chain’s profit gains, it would prefer
to stay in the zone pricing equilibrium rather than invest in market level pricing.
The magnitude of bounds we calculate here could be consistent with a managerial
source to the spatial menu costs. Retail segments with more elastic industry
demand or with less substitubility between competitors should have the higher
profit gains. If those profit gain are enough to overcome spatial menu costs,
retailers will use market level pricing or smaller pricing zones.
2.5.3 Metagame Analysis
Pricing and Profits
In this section we explore the metagame in which firms choose to adopt zone
pricing or market level pricing. There are millions of zone combinations so we only
explore the option of selecting the current zone structure for each firm, or a move
to market level pricing for the entire network. We calculate the Bertrand-Nash
Equilibrium (BNE) for four pricing regimes: Lowe’s and Home Depot keep their
current zone structure, Lowe’s moves to market level pricing and Home Depot
keeps its current zone regime, Home Depot moves to market level pricing and
Lowe’s keeps its current zone structure, and finally, both firms move to market
level pricing. Prices adjust for all products in all periods.
As previously noted, there are multiple equilibria for each of these pricing
regimes. We utilize a selection mechanism on the number of products with low
sales. Due to the logit error term, high prices yield marginal sales, but the firm
may choose to set very high prices so that consumers substitute to other products
with better margins. Of the equilibria found, we select the equilibrium for each
scenario that has the lowest number of products priced sufficiently high as to yield
marginal sales. For example, in solving for equilibria based on the current zone
structure, there are equilibria in which the price of a product is such that sales
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are close to 10−6 sheets per week. We sum up the number of product-store com-
binations in which this occurs and select the equilibrium with the lowest number.
We gauge the performance of this selection mechanism by comparing the observed
zone equilibrium with the calculated zone equilibria. The lowest number of obser-
vations with marginal sales is 306. The median difference between equilibrium and
observed zone prices is $0.007 and the mean difference is $0.11. Lowe’s observed
annual profit is $8,330,954 for the 53 stores in the sample. With our selection
mechanism, we calculate equilibrium zone profits for Lowe’s at $8,301,573. For
Home Depot, we obtain observed and equilibrium zone price profits of $20,363,560
and $20,736,293, respectively. Other selection mechanisms, such as the sum of to-
tal profits, yields unrealistic equilibrium profits given observed sales.
If both firms choose zone pricing in all markets, in all periods, we must solve
for nearly 7,000 prices. The other three possible outcomes have even more prices
to solve for. The optimality conditions on firms’ problems are highly nonlinear,
so we solve for equilibria using state of the art solvers. To search for equilibria,
we set 1,000 random starts and solve for the fixed point. On average, around
one-third of the starts converge to a fixed point – a BNE for the regime choice.
Since both firms utilize zone pricing, we solve for two parameters of the meta
game: a lower point on the menu costs associated with adopted market level
pricing. Table 2.9 provides the payoff matrix associated with the metagame. In
the absence of menu costs, both Lowe’s and Home Depot would adopt market
level pricing; however, in this case, Lowe’s obtains lower profits with market level
pricing than with zone pricing. This is due to both higher demand for Home
Depot products in general, as well as a cost advantage in the stores located around
Salt Lake City, where Home Depot has a distribution center, but Lowe’s does not.
This allows Home Depot to undercut Lowe’s and gain market share. This analysis
shows that a finer degree of pricing – in this case the ability to discriminate at
the market level – does not lead to larger profits, a possibility noted in Holmes
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(1989). Indeed, additional competition hurts Lowe’s, but provides a nearly 14%
increase in profits for Home Depot.
Table 2.9: Metagame of market or current zone pricing
Lowe’s / HD Zone Pricing Market Pricing
Zone Pricing $8,301,573, $20,736,293 $7,681,509 , $21,667,885−µHD
Market Pricing $8,705,745−µL, $20,937,713 $7,818,741−µL, $23,632,457−µHD
The zone numbers are equilibrium zone profits instead of observed profits.
Also in the absence of menu costs, we find that moving to market level pricing
for a single firm increases profits for that firm. Lowe’s sees a 4.8% increase in pre-
menu cost profits by moving to market level pricing with Home Depot keeping its
zone structure. Home Depot also sees modest gains with this regime at 0.97%.
On the other hand, if Home Depot moves to market level pricing but Lowe’s keeps
its zone structure, Home Depot sees a 4.8% increase in profits, largely due to the
ability to discriminate in monopoly markets. However, with this regime, Home
Depot’s competitive advantages, both in costs and demand, results in a 5.9%
decrease in profits for Lowe’s.
For zone pricing to be the solution of the metagame in pure strategies, it
must be the case that µL ≥ $404, 172 and µHD ≥ 2, 694, 744. These numbers
represent lower bounds on the menu costs associated with adopting market level
pricing. These equate to 4.8% and 13.0% of profits for Lowe’s and Home Depot,
respectively. Together, this yields a menu cost of 10.3% of industry profits, about
half the figure calculated using single product deviations. Other market level
pricing equilibria exist, some giving much higher profits that match or exceed
the menu costs of Section 5. The lower profits in the selected equilibrium could
reflect the substitutability between products. Price decreases on one product could
prompt the rival firm to discount other products. The increased competition on
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all products (instead of on only one product) may reduce market share, prompting
further rounds of discounting, and lower profits.
Table 2.10 provides summary statistics at the market level across the various
pricing regimes of the metagame. The table also provides a summary of the equi-
librium in which firms use uniform pricing. We find Lowe’s would earn higher
profits under uniform pricing than zone pricing (utilizing our selection mecha-
nism). This is consistent with Lowe’s earning lower profits under market level
pricing than zone pricing; that is, Lowe’s benefits when Home Depot has limited
ability to price discriminate. Under zone pricing, Home Depot balances the ben-
efits of discriminating in monopoly markets with its desire to undercut Lowe’s in
duopoly markets. This allows Lowe’s to capture market share in duopoly markets
that it would not if Home Depot priced at the zone or market level. With uniform
pricing, Home Depot obtains approximately $18.8 million in profits, $1.8 million
less than when both firms use zone pricing and nearly $5.0 million less than when
both firms use market level pricing.
Since Home Depot operates several monopoly stores as part of larger zones,
finer pricing results in monopoly prices in these markets, whereas with uniform
and zone level pricing, Home Depot balances discriminating in these markets with
competing with Lowe’s in other markets. The relationship between zone structure
and profits is opposite for Lowe’s. With a cost disadvantage in the large Salt Lake
City market, lower mean utility overall for products, and few monopoly stores,
Lowe’s does not capture additional profits from finer pricing. Instead, the chain
benefits when Home Depot has reduced ability to discriminate in competitive
markets.
Consumer Surplus
Finally, we investigate how consumer surplus changes across pricing regimes.
Given the nested logit demand system, the change in consumer surplus across
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pricing regimes for consumer i at location ` can be written as
E[∆CSi,`] :=
1
α
[
ln
(
1 +
∑
g
D1−σg (Z
′)
)
− ln
(
1 +
∑
g
D1−σg (Z)
)]
,
where Dg =
∑
j∈Jg exp(δj/1−σ), Z ′ represents prices under counterfactual zones,
and Z represents prices under observed zones. Multiplying E[∆CSi,`] by M` yields
the total change in consumer surplus for a single market. We then aggregate across
markets to calculate the total change in consumer surplus.
Table 2.11 quantifies the change in consumer surplus across four counterfactual
scenarios. In the aggregate, we find that equilibrium uniform pricing results in
the highest consumer surplus, increasing consumer surplus by nearly $500,000
annually for the 128 stores in the sample. Market-level pricing results in higher
prices for consumers and decreases consumer surplus by close to $1 million. The
move for one chain to adopt uniform pricing while the competitor sets optimal
zone pricing under observed zones has varying impact. If Lowe’s moves to uniform
pricing, we find consumer surplus goes down by nearly $100,000 annually; however,
if Home Depot moves to uniform pricing, consumer surplus goes up by nearly
$300,000. These figures reflect both the estimated Home Depot costs advantage
and that Home Depot operates many more monopoly stores in the sample.
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Table 2.11: Consumer Surplus Across Pricing Regimes
Regime Change Agg. E[∆CS] min` (E[∆CS`]) max` (E[∆CS`])
Zone → Uniform $473,762 -$135,721 $181,456
Zone → Market -$965,073 -$196,841 $12,354
Zone → Lowe’s Unif. -$94,488 -$95,082 $39,646
Zone → HD Uniform $285,748 -$46,164 $69,625
The direction of consumer surplus changes under uniform and market-level
pricing are opposite of what they are for firms; however, the magnitudes differ
substantially. After accounting for the change in profits under different regimes
and zero menu costs, we find uniform pricing lowers total surplus by $1,003,791
annually, whereas market level pricing increases total welfare by $1,725,683 annu-
ally.
2.6 Conclusion
In this article, we document the prevalence of zone pricing in home improvement
retail stores. Although product categories such as drywall and lumber have sizable
price variation nationally, within regions there can be no price variation within
firm. The size of zones, including the number of stores and the number of markets
per zone, varies from product category to product category. We find some prod-
uct categories with hundreds of zones, and for other categories, a single firm, or
uniform pricing, is pursued by a firm. Having different zone structures by product
category is not surprising given that retailers have separate marketing managers
for different product categories. The choice of the zone structure reveals how
firms balance discrimination and competition across markets. We postulate that
the use of zone pricing, instead of a finer grade of pricing, such as by market or by
117
store, is the result of firms facing a friction – “spatial menu costs”. These spatial
menu costs have induced firms to set a constant price over multiple markets.
To provide a measure of the spatial menu costs needed to rationalize the use
of zone pricing, we estimate a structural model of consumer demand on a de-
tailed data set of retail drywall. We find that consumers consider the products of
competing chains to be close substitutes, but the industry elasticity for drywall
is inelasitic. Assuming firms are engaged in Bertrand price competition, we back
out marginal costs to find that transportation costs are a small, but significant,
component of costs.
Given our estimates on supply and demand, our menu costs are calculated
by comparing the observed profits in zone level competition to the equilibrium
profits in which firms adopt market level pricing. Since firms are offering multiple
products, priced uniformly across several markets, multiple equilibria exist. To
obtain menu cost estimates, we investigate small deviations in the current zone
structure which result in unique counterfactual equilibria. Finding the equilibria
for these alternative pricing regimes yields a lower bound on the spatial menu
costs at 2.2% of current revenues or 22% of observed profits. While the previous
literature on zone pricing has determined menu costs may be large, these articles
have not taken into account the competitive interaction of firms. We find that
ignoring competitive effects by fixing opponents prices implies much larger gains
from market level pricing which overstates the spatial menu costs by upwards of
32%, at 3.3% of observed revenues.
Spatial menu costs force firms into a price zone system that prevents them from
abusing their market power. In an industry like drywall with high transportation
costs and inelastic demand, menu costs and zone pricing protect consumers in
monopoly markets. The elimination of the menu costs would prompt a new level
of strategic competition in the duopoly markets, but according to our estimates
would still leave the retailer more profitable.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Accuracy of Seat Maps
I perform two analyses to address the potential measurement error with using seat
maps to proxy bookings. First, I match statistics of my data with reported car-
rier data found in the T100 US Segment tables. The T100 Segment tables report
actual monthly enplanements for an origin, destination, air carrier. I aggregate
the number of occupied seats the day flights leave to the monthly level for each
route-month and compare with the T100. A scatter plot comparing monthly en-
planements can be seen in Figure A.1 Most points lie very close to the 45-degree
line (zero measurement error at the monthly level) indicating a close match be-
tween actual monthly enplanements and the totals calculated from seat maps. The
points highlighted in blue correspond to the city pair Kansas City, Boston, oper-
ated by Delta Air Lines. Delta switched regional carriers in this market during
August 2012. My programming scripts failed to pick up the changes in flight num-
bers, which resulted in more than half of the month’s flights from being tracked.
However, the other means are still close to the 45-degree line. By comparing these
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aggregate measures, I find my seat maps understate true enplanements by 0.81%
of load factor at the monthly level.
Figure A.1: Comparison of monthly enplanements of T100 US Segment and
sample seat maps
Notes: Each points corresponds to an airline, month, origin, destination traffic count. Points
on the dotted line have zero monthly measurement error.
However, comparing enplanements with the T100 does not address the issue
of consumers purchasing tickets but not selecting seats at the time of booking. To
this end, I create an additional data set from an airline that provides flight loads
and seat maps on its website. I collect 18,107 seat maps and reported flight load
by randomly selecting routes and days until departure over a five month period.
Unfortunately, the airline does does not operate in the markets I study, so this
constitutes an out of sample analysis. Further, this data is only for business class
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Figure A.2: Estimated measurement error by day before departure
Notes: Spline fit comparing seat map total with reported flight load by day before departure.
Also, load factor using reported flight load by day before departure.
cabins with a range of 25 to over 50 seats. Of course, a one seat difference is
a much higher percentage of load factor compared to the capacities in my data.
This may exaggerate the measurement error percentage. At the same time time,
it may be that more economy class consumers do not select tickets at the time of
booking. With this data set, I find that the seat maps understate actual loads by
2.3% on average. Few seat maps overstate the number of occupied seats, so the
direction is the bias is mostly downward.
I use this secondary data set to estimate the measurement error by day before
departure. Figure A.2 plots a nonparametric fit of the the measurement error
126
along with average load factor by day before departure. This plot shows that
the measurement error remains small across time, at between 0.0% and 4.3% of
load factor. At the same time, the measurement error is not flat indicating some
days are more accurate than others. The worst measurement error between two
and three weeks prior to departure. Seat maps are most accurate either well in
advance or close to the departure date.
Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Monte Carlo Experiments
In this section we conduct Monte Carlo experiments of our cost estimator. We
show the key parameter in the cost functions of firms is estimated with little bias
and a low mean-squared error.
In the Monte Carlos, the true model specifies a profit maximizing monopolist
using zone pricing and facing costs of the form
cjszt = aj + κdsz + νjzt.
With this notation, store s belongs to a zone z. Hence, in a model specifying Z = 3
and S = 2, this implies the firm has 3 zones, each with 2 stores. In all experiments,
we use a discrete choice logit demand system where the market is set equal to the
zone; that is, consumers select amongst all J × S products in a given purchasing
period. The pricing decision can still be thought of as zone pricing because the
firm operates several stores within the market, and these stores have different
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costs; however, the price for a product must be identical across stores. The Monte
Carlos specify a monopolist only to ease the computational burden of solving for
profit-maximizing prices. The procedure extends to models with competition by
changing how optimal prices are found. The cost estimation procedure remains
unchanged.
For the simulations, we specify the utility of the consumers as equal to U =
β − αpjzt + ξjszt. We set β = 3, α = −0.3 and ξ ∼ N (0, 3). For costs, we assign
Distance Coefficient κ = −0.01
Distance Data dsz ∼ |N(300, 40)|
Product FE aj ∼ |N (8, 3)|
Cost Unobserved ν ∼ N (0, 9)
With the data generating process defined, our Monte Carlo procedure first
finds optimal prices p∗ by maximizing the profit function of the firm:
p∗ ∈ argmaxp
∑
j,s,z,t
(pjzt − cjszt)Mztsjszt(p).
We use a state of the art solver to calculate profit-maximizing prices given costs.
The next step in the Monte Carlo procedure is to then back out costs given
optimal prices and distance data. Our key parameter of interest is κ – the parame-
ter on distance; however, the estimates of the product-specific cost intercepts (aj)
could also be of interest. We estimate costs using the cost estimation approach in
Section 3. As we discuss there, the traditional approach in the industrial organiza-
tion literature is to back out costs using either Lerner’s Index or the multiproduct
analog. In a second step, the cost parameters are estimated using GMM. Our
novel approach is to estimate the costs in a single step using mathematical pro-
gramming with equilibrium constraints (MPEC). We proceed with this method
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because the first order conditions (FOCs) for the firm’s problem contain all costs
for a product within a zone. This means we cannot use Lerner’s index to recover
costs directly. One resitrction of our approach is that we assume that the unob-
served cost term does not vary by store. If we allowed this flexibility, our approach
would lead to an underindentification problem as discussed in Section 3.
With our proposed estimator, costs and the parameters associated with costs
are recovered by solving
min
c,θS
m(θS; W)
s.t. FOC(c; θS) = 0,
where W := [d, aj] is data that enters the cost function, and m(·) is a loss func-
tion, such as a GMM criterion function. In the formulation above, identification
comes from the dim(θS) moment conditions in the criterion function and that the
constraints are such that dim(FOC) = dim(ν).
Simulation results appear in Table B.1 where we report the bias of the esti-
mator along with the mean squared error for the distance parameter for different
values of S, J and T . For all experiments, we assign Z = 10. The left set of ex-
periments shows changes in the number of stores operated by the firm, and on the
right, we report experiments with changes in the number of products offered. The
table shows that the estimator performs well. For all experiments, the parameter
of interest (distance) is estimated with a small bias and small mean-squared er-
ror. Our cost estimation procedure estimates the cost parameters precisely for all
experiments, ranging from 4,500 cost variables to recover, to 54,000 cost variables.
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Table B.1: Monte Carlo Experiments of Cost Estimator
T S
MPEC using FOCs
T J
MPEC using FOCs
Bias MSE Bias MSE
50 3 0.001 8.102e-6 50 3 0.001 1.016e-5
6 0.001 8.593e-6 6 0.001 7.261e-6
9 0.002 1.784e-5 9 0.001 5.813e-6
100 3 0.002 1.634e-5 100 3 0.001 9.882e-6
6 0.001 1.051e-5 6 0.001 5.921e-6
9 0.002 1.019e-5 9 0.001 3.828e-6
Notes: The data generating process specifies a profit maximizing monopolist, with a distance
parameter of κ = .01. In the first set of experiments (left), we set J = 6. For the second set
(right), we set S = 3. To estimate the cost parameters, we first calculate optimal prices given
true costs, and then using optimal prices, back out costs. We run 200 iterations per
experiment, recovering costs using the interior point - conjugate gradient algorithm in Knitro
9.0. Computations are done on on a 4-core Linux machine with a 4.1 Ghz OC Intel CPU.
